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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the beginning
the airlines
industries.

of commercial

air travel,

have been among the most regulated
Aside from extensively

safety,

technical

standards

nations

have also traditionally

aspects

of the airline business.

this by restricting

regulating

and operational

of

aviation

procedures,

controlled

the commercial

Most nations have done

their airline markets

to one state

owned airline.
The United
private

states is one of the few nations where

ownership

permitted

and more than one carrier has been

since the inception

of the industry.

However,

even then, for over forty years the federal government
strictly

controlled

airlines.
the market
airlines

It also severely

restricted

and prohibited

acquisitions

without

its prior approval.

routes were reserved
distinction

the routes, rates and capacity

for "national"

was maintained

fly on international

of the

entry and exit from
and mergers
In addition,

carriers

between carriers

of
domestic

and a clear
permitted

flights and those permitted

1

had

to

to fly on

2

domestic

routes.

excluded

from the domestic market.

The Airline
international

foreign competitors

Deregulation

counterpart,

Transportation
important

Finally,

competition

departure

from this traditional
Almost

complex

regulatory

structure

reversal

Air

Act of 19792, marked

regulation.

an untested

Act of 19781 and its

The International

airline

four decades,

were

overnight,

an

approach

to the

it did away with a

that had existed

for over

and left the industry to the indulgence

market.

of

Not only was this type of abrupt

of regulatory

policy rare in a democracy,S

it

was also the first attempt by any nation to permit
airlines

to run as normal commercial

their own economic
beginning

decisions.

of the deregulated

the

This thesis will review
airline

industry

order to assess the claim that this experiment
and the industry

and make

As such, it marked

of a unique experiment.

the performance

enterprises

in

has failed

needs to be reregulated.

1

Pub. L. No 95-504, 92 stat. 1705 (codified
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)
2 Pub. L. No 96-192, 94 stat. 35 (codified
scattered sections of 49 U.S.c.).

in

in

8 Historical
experience as well as political reform
theory suggests that proposals to alter regulatory
controls by extinguishing the authority of the regulator
produce substantial political opposition. See ANTHONY E.
BROWN, THE POLITICS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION, 4 (1987); For a
review of political theory relating to economic
deregulation see DOUGLAS D. ANDERSON, REGULATORY POLITICS, Ch.
1 (1981)

3

1.1

Clarification

of Key Terms

As the expressions
"reregulation"
following

"regulation",

"deregulation"

will be used quite frequently

discussions,

it is necessary

in the

to clarify

outset what these expressions

mean. Deregulation,

intuitively,

from regulation.

suggests

freedom

meaning

regulation

has been defined

activity

as "a process

restriction

that activity.,,5 Deregulation

the manner

choice of

party to or involved

can be defined

complete

however,

in

as "the

does not bring out clearly

in which the expression

discussions

deregulation

choice

of

of such a choice restriction.,,6

This definition,

policy

In fact the

consisting

of a subject's

by an entity not directly

removal

at the

is just that.4 More technically,

dictionary

the intentional

and

and literature

of airlines.7

removal

is used in public
relating

Deregulation

of all government

so as to leave the industry

to the

does not mean the

restrictions
concerned

on private

in a state

4 For instance,
the Webster's New World Dictionary
defines "deregulation" as "to remove regulations
governing" and further qualifies it as an expression of
American origin, which it indeed is. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH, 371 (Third College Edition,
1988) •
5

BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION:
CREATING, DESIGNING AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS, 9 (1980).
This "entity" could be both a government or a private
body. We are concerned with regulation by the government.
6

Id.,at418.

7

Or, for that matter,

any other industry.

4

where no regulation
consists

exists. Broadly construed,

of all controls

and articulate

making of economic

truly regulation-less
The expression

which

deregulation,

rather,

to the industry or activity

discretion

actors. As such, a

set of regulatory

leaves the concerned

greater

intervention

state would be impossible

of some specific

peculiar

impose duties

the nature and scope of public

into the decision

removal

that define rights,

regulation

economic

to attain.

signifies

the

controls

being deregulated,
8

entities

in the matter of economic

with
decision

ma k'
l.ng.9
To understand

the process by which an industry

is

deregulated,

it is helpful to distinguish

between

"restricting

choice" through regulatory

"influencing

choice" through other forms of government

control

and

intervention.
In the first case, the actual conduct
commercial
required

8

enterprise

is controlled.

to take administrative

i.e., producers

of the

Private management

clearance

is

before taking

and consumers.

9 Deregulation
may also be defined in other ways. ~
qenerallv MITNICK, supra note 5. Mitnick notes that the
expression has been used with respect to 1) the stated
purpose or intended consequences of deregulation, 2) the
type of activity which is to be deregulated, and 3) the
regulatory instruments or authority which is removed as a
result of deregulation; the expression is also sometimes
used in situations of "de facto" regulation, where
conditions approximating deregulation are attained through
lax enforcement of regulations, and not by any formal
reduction of regulatory authority of a government agency.

5

certain

actions,

discretionary
regulation
problems

and the regulatory

powers to supervise

emphasizes

11

"administrative",
"public-utility

the industry.10 Such

the prevention

and are commonly

agency uses broad

of potential

characterized

"direct", positive",

as "classical",
"hands-on",

type", or "command-and-control"

regu 1a t·~on. 12
"Influencing
hand,

is achieved

intervention
disclosure

choice" through regulation,
through

like antitrust

enforcement,

rules, taxes and subsidies,

incentives,

and liability

private

litigation.

conduct

by providing

which are designed
conduct.

less intrusive

information
market

based

through

aim to influence

a mix of rewards and punishments

to induce a certain kind of desirable

The underlying

consequences

forms of

rules enforceable

Such regulations

on the other

assumption

here is that once the

of certain actions are known the course of

action which maximizes

the awards and minimizes

punishment

will be chosen. However,

management

and not the government

the

it is private

which decides what this

course of action will be.
These two forms of regulation
mutually

10

exclusive.

BROWN,

In the real world various

supra note 3, at 25.

11

Id., at 24.

12

Id.

are by no means
combinations

6

of regulatory
private

instruments

may be used to ensure that

conduct conforms to public standards.

Deregulation,

therefore,

can be said to occur when there

is a shift from a combination

of regulatory

emphasizing

on classical

regulation,

to one which relies primarily

't rUS1ve
'f
1ess 1n

orms

Reregulation

command-

controls

and-control

0ft'
governmen

type of

on indirect,

1n t erven t'10n. ~

is an expression

used to signify a

return to a former system of direct regulation

after a

period of deregulation.

Though the expression

otherwise,

is not the only alternative

reregulation

deregulation.

A different

forms of regulatory

combination

may suggest
to

of non-intrusive

controls can be substituted

for the

same.
Deregulation

in the context of the American

airline

industry meant a change from a system of direct regulation
of routes, rates, entry and exit, by the civil Aeronautics
Board

(CAB), to one of antitrust

scrutiny

and safety

monitoring

which left the economic decisions

discretion

of the airlines.

Reregulation,

means a return to a CAB type regulatory

to the

in this context,
regime.

13 This shift has to be significant.
Mere incremental
change in the structure of regulatory control resulting in
marginal increase in private discretion would not be
deregulation though it may be labelled as
"liberalization". The difference is one of degree and not
amenable to precise definition.

7

1.2

Issues Raised

by Airline

The u.s. deregulation
of considerable

academic

Deregulation

experience

has been the focus

study and debate.

proliferation

of literature

of regulatory

structure

following

has prompted

The

the dramatic

change

one commentator

to

remark

that "the study of airline deregulation

almost

a cottage

industry

insiders

industry.

Indeed economists,

and academicians

about the desirability
continued

,,14

has become
lawyers,

who had earlier

of deregulating

to study it to see whether

the industry
the outcome

debated
have

of the

.
t suppor t e d th e ear I ~er
.
exper~men
pre d'~c t'~ons. 15
The results
conformed

of deregulation,

to all of the theoretical

however,

have not

projections

based on

14 Michael
E. Levine, Airline Competition in
Derequlated Markets: Theory. Firm strategy. and Public
POlicy, 4 YALE JOURNAL ON REGULATION 393, 394 (1987)
[hereinafter Levine(1987»).

15 See e. q., E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN,
DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES (1985); CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, REpORT
TO CONGRESS, IMPLEMENTATIONOF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978 (1984); CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1983); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEREGULATION IS MAKING AIRLINES MORE EFFICIENT
AND RESPONSIVE TO CONSUMERS (1985); J. MEYER, C. OSTER, I.
MORGAN, B. BERMAN & D. STRASSMAN, AIRLINE DEREGULATION:THE EARLy
EXPERIENCE (1981); S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1986); M. BRENNER, J. LEET &
E. SCHOTT, AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1985); P. DEMPSEY, THE SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION (1989); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR FARES AND SERVICE AT CONCENTRATED AIRPORTS
(1989); Goetz & Dempsey, Airline Derequlation Ten Years
After: Something Foul in the Air, 54 J. AIR L.& COM. 927
(1989); Levine (1987) supra note 14.

8

economic

models prepared

economists.16

by pro-deregulation

Nor has it fulfilled

completely

the
17

prophesy

of doom of those opposed to deregulation.

has prompted

some academicians

to reappraise

This

the earlier

theories

and look for explanations

behavior

and the debate about the wisdom of deregulating

the industry

still continues.

However,

all but the most zealous advocates

in the debate have conceded
deregulation
in general,
service

choice,

industry

consumers

costs and,

with a wider range of

it has been a mixed blessing.

In

about the effects

on airline safety, the post deregulation

concentration"

practices

reduced

concern has been expressed

of deregulation

involved

that though airline

has improved efficiency,
provided

particular,

for this deviant

the evolution

in the use of computerized

of anti-competitive

reservation

systems,

monopoly

leverage through the use of hub and spoke

routing,

and the over stretching

excessive

1.3

of finances

leading to

debt and bankruptcy.

Scope and Focus of the Thesis
The importance

differs

given to these results

of deregulation

from author to author as do their prescriptions

for the problems

faced by the deregulated

W

See infra Chapter

17

Id.

4.

industry.

But

9

their study is important
Firstly,

it provides

the airline
absence

industry

for at least three reasons.

valuable

and how airlines

of direct government

likely to be useful
executives

compete

restrictions.

in the

Secondly,

it is

for policy makers and airline

in the united

about future policy

insight about the nature of

states when dealing with issues

in the united states. Finally,

such a

study would provide useful guidance

for nations

experimenting

airline deregulation

with or contemplating

or privatization.
working

For how other governments

of the airline

materially

industry under deregulation

affect their own pOlicies

deregulation,
airline

the assumptions

industry,

will

regime prior

and objectives

and the actual working

the

in this regard.

This thesis will review the regulatory
to deregulation,

perceive

of

of the deregulated

in order to assess the validity

of the

claims of some critics that the industry needs to be
reregulated.
This review will reveal that the policy makers had
relied

on economic models based on erroneous

about the nature of airline competition
deregulation.
industry

Consequently,

under

the developments

were not anticipated

assumptions

in the

by them.

The Thesis will suggest that the existing
structure

is not adequate

potential

problems

regulatory

to deal with the present

of the deregulated

industry.

and

However,

a

10

reversion

to a CAB type regulatory

system is not

justified.
Instead,

what seems to be needed is a determined

effort to strengthen

the existing machinery

unanticipated

problems

deregulation.

In addition,

that have arisen after
will be suggested

necessary

to explore the possibilities

intrusive

forms of regulatory

the market

to tackle the

of using less

instruments

and fortify the existing

that it is

to supplement

structure.

It is

beyond the scope of this thesis to try to offer "concrete
solutions"

to the problems.

What is intended,

instead,

is

to shift the focus of the present debate from its
fruitless

"inadequate

antitrust

(CAB type) regulation"
assumption

enforcement

obsession,

that "reregulation"

v. imperfect

with its underlying

is the only alternative

to

"deregulation".

1.4

Organization
Chapter

thesis.

1 of the thesis

Chapter

regulatory

of the Thesis

2

will provide

structure

prior to deregulation,
transition
structure

states

3 will deal with the

and the changes

about by it. Chapter

and predictions

of the

of the

in the United

while Chapter

the actual outcome of deregulation
presumptions

the subject

a background

which existed

to deregulation
brought

introduces

in regulatory

4 will deal with

in the light of the

of the proponents

of

11

deregulation.

Chapter

5 will consider

problem

of ineffectual

Chapter

7 will sum up the findings

briefly

touch upon the policy

deregulation

antitrust

experience.

in more detail the

enforcement.

Finally,

of the review and

implications

of the

Chapter

2

THE REGULATORY

STRUCTURE

This chapter
features

will discuss

of the regulatory

to deregulation.
of authority

some of the salient

structure

In particular

exercised

the limitations

2.1

PRIOR TO DEREGULATION

which existed

it will review

prior

the nature

by the civil Aeronautics

Board and

of such regulations.

The civil Aeronautics

Act of 1938 and the formation

of CAB
Though

the basic features

of the regulatory

scheme

.
18
h a d b egun t 0 evo 1ve muc h ear 1 ler,
compre h'
enSlve
government
United

economic

States

Aeronautics
provided

regulation

of civil aviation

started with the enactment
19

Act of 1938.

in the

of the Civil

The 1938 Act originally

for a single agency,

the Civil Aeronautics

18

For an account of the origins of airline
regulation in the United States, See BROWN, supra note 3
at 5-10; A. T. WELLS, AIR TRANSPORTATION : A MANAGEMENT
PERSPECTIVE, Ch. 2 (1984); R.E.G. DAVIES, AIRLINES OF THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1914 (1972); Levine, Revisionism Revised
? Airline Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (1981).
.. 1 Aeronau t lCS
.
T h e C1Vl
Ac t
706, 52 STAT. 977.
19

12

0f

1938, Pu b . L. No.7 5-

13
Authority
aspects

to supervise

both the technical

of civil aviation.

the regulatory

framework

and the civil Aeronautics
Aeronautics
economic
states,
turned
whose

Board

and economic

By means of an executive

initially
Authority

set up was reorganized
was renamed

(CAB)20. The CAB was charged

supervision

of commercial

while the regulation

aviation

of technical

over to an administrator

order

the civil

with the

in the United

matters

was

of civil aeronautics,

staff was called the civil Aeronautics

..
t ra t lone
.
21
A d mlnlS

2.2

The Powers

and Functions

The CAB's regulatory
features

authority

found in classical
22

legislation.

of the CAB

public

contained
utility

Some of them are discussed

many

type of

below.

20 Reorganization
Plan 12 of 1940, Section
Section 7(a) 54 STAT. 1235.

7(a) 54

21

See Westwood & Bennett, A Footnote to the civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Afterword, 42 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
309 (1967).
22

See Generallv, BROWN supra note 3, at 44-60; GEORGE
W. DOUGLAS & JAMES C. MILLER III, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY (1974); BAILEY et
all, supra note 15, at 11-26.

14
carrier

2.2 (i)

Firstly,
aviation

no carrier

without

requirement
provided

certification

in commercial

The certification

was the most important

regulatory

instrument

to the CAB. 24
granted

to an airline

stipulated

to be served as well the kind of airline

the carrier
classify

could provide.25

an airline

passenger

services,

or charter
demand

could engage

certification.23

The certificates
routes

Authoritv

airlines

as a scheduled
an all-cargo

airline

carrier

providing

or a supplemental

passenger

services

on a

26

Moreover,
"city-pair"

service

Thus it was up to the CAB to

service which provided

basis.

the

a certificate

granted

for a particular

could also lay down conditions

would have to fulfil

fly on the route

which

the

in order to be allowed

for which the certificate

to

was granted.27

23 civil Aeronautics
Act, section 401(a)-(e), 72
STAT. 754. Under a "grandfather clause" carriers who had
been providing continuous and regular service from May 14,
1938, till August 22, 1938, the date on which the Act came
into force, were entitled to receive a certificate of
"public convenience and necessity". civil Aeronautics Act,
section 401(e).
24

Brown, supra note 3, at 47; ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
AVIATION LAw § 1.3.
25

BROWN, supra note 3, at 47, NAWAL K. TANEJA, THE
COMMERCIAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY, (1976), at 5-6; WILLIAM A. JORDON,
AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA, EFFECTS AND IMPERFECTIONS (1970),
at 14-17.
26
27

BROWN, supra note 3, at 47-48.
Id.

15
Such conditions
scheduled

could stipulate

flights

particular

flights

about whether

a city-pair,

it would

Finally,

or could direct the airline

along the route.28 The airline

cities

had no discretion
stop between

operate

from the air transport

made

enabled

of airlines

airlines

of

thus

fly nonnumber

of

time period.29

over entry into and exit

The requirement

of

both the total

and the total number

Its classification
the structure

of airlines

services

to stop

could discontinue

the CAB to control

routes.

over a

of the CAB.3o The CAB

for it to control

cargo or supplemental

28

control

market.

i.e. the number

and on particular

airline

in the industry

on particular

it possible

industry,

in a particular

the permission

was thus given effective

number

or not it would

nor about the minimum

no certificated

its routes without

certification

number

the airline would have to operate

time period

at specified

the minimum

providing

in the industry

of

power
of the
passenger,

as a whole

routes.

Id.

29

Id. However, the civil Aeronautics Act did reserve
some discretion to for the managers of regulated airlines
when it stipulated that "no term, condition, or limitation
of a certificate shall restrict the right of an air
carrier to change schedules, equipment, accomodations,
and
facilities for performing the authorized service and
transportation,"
(Civil Aeronautics Act, section 401(j»,
a provision which resulted in the non price competition
between carriers.
30

BROWN, supra note 3, at 47; TANEJA, supra note 25.
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2.2(ii)

Rate Fixinq Authority

Secondly,
the fixing
required

of rates for air services.31

to file tariffs

rate schedules.
own accord
party

the CAB was given extensive

32

The CAB could change

over

were
their

such rates on its

to a complaint

if it ruled that the existing

minimum

Carriers

with the Board specifying

or in response

unreasonable".~

authority

from a third

rate was "unjust

The CAB could also fix maximum

or

and

rates.M

In addition

to this broad rate fixing power,

was also responsible
air carriers

for channelizing

of government

The Board was authorized
the economic
maintenance

payments

direct

to fix mail rates according

and continual
36

system.

subsidies

for mail transport.

needs of each air carrier

transportation

the CAB

development

to
35

to

and to insure the
of the air

with all these powers,

the CAB

31

civil Aeronautics

Act, section

1002(d),

72 STAT.

32

civil Aeronautics

Act, section

1002(d),

72 STAT.

78.
788.
33 civil Aeronautics
Act, section
See BROWN, supra note 3, at 49.

34

civil Aeronautics

Act, section

1002, 72 STAT. 788;

1002(d) ,72 STAT.

788.
35

36

BROWN, supra note 3, at 49.

civil Aeronautics Act, section
See BROWN, supra note 3, at 49.

406, 72 STAT. 763;

17
virtually
carrier

dictated

would

2.2(iii)

Over Economic

relations

airlines

and common

of airlines
carriers

control

was exercised

mergers,

acquisitions

CAB approval.

purchase

Relations

like trucking

in two ways:

Clearance

over the

firms.37 Such

First, proposals

and consolidations

38

control

with other certificated

This requirement

lease or other contractual

carriers.

a

Of Carriers

the CAB was given extensive

economic

needed

of revenue

earn.

Control

Thirdly,

the nature and amount

was also needed

for

of airlines
included

arrangement

any
among

for interlocking

39

directorates.
Second,
cooperative
40

assent.

inter-carrier
working

arrangements

Cooperative

baggage

maintenance

or ownership,

facilities,

pooling

losses

clearance

cooperative

and
CAB's

joint equipment
passenger

or earnings,

of airline

ticketing

sharing

of

operation

from CAB.

civil Aeronautics
STAT. 767-772, 774.

40

also required

of resources

37

39

agreements

handling,

and other such features

required

38

operating

Act, Section

408-413,

415, 72

Civil Aeronautics

Act, section

408, 72 STAT. 767.

civil Aeronautics

Act, section

409, 72 STAT. 768.

civil Aeronautics

Act, section

408, 72 STAT. 767.

18

2.2(iv)

Antitrust

Fourthly,
carriers

Exemption

the CAB had the authority

from the operation

as from prosecution
could exempt
regulation

Authority

of its own regulations

under the Antitrust

any carrier

to exempt
as well

laws. The CAB

from the application

of a CAB

if it felt that doing so was in the public

. t eres t .41
ln
Since many of the inter-carrier
by the CAB in accordance
Act could raise antitrust
under the Antitrust
the carriers
laws.

agreements

with the standards

approved

of the 1938

issues and entail prosecution

laws, the CAB was empowered

immunity

from prosecution

to grant

under the antitrust

42

2.2 (v)

Investigations,

Finally,
deceptive

Inspections

the CAB was authorized

trade practices

as well as enforce

and monitor

compliance.43

periodical

to investigate

and unfair methods

competition

furnish

And Compliance

its orders

Carriers

and special

containing

such information

management

as demanded

43

and regulations

were obliged

reports

to

to the CAB

about its operations

or

by the CAB. The CAB also had the

41 civil Aeronautics
Act, section
775. See BROWN, supra note 3, at 50.

42

of

civil Aeronautics
civil Aeronautical

Act, section
Act, Section

416(b),

72 STAT.

415, 72 STAT. 764.
415, 72 STAT. 774.

19

statutory

authority

to inspect carrier records

and

facilities.

2.3

CAB Ambivalence

Towards Competition

The declaration

of policy contained

Aeronautics

in the civil

Act of 1938 laid down that:

"Section

2. In exercise

this Act the Authority"

of its powers and duties under
shall consider

the following

among other things as being in the Public interest,
in accordance

with the public convenience

a) The encouragement
transportation

and development

system properly

and necessity-

of an air

adapted to the present

future needs of the foreign and domestic
united

and

States, of the Postal Service

commerce

and

of the

and of the National

defence;
b) The regulation
as to recognize

of air transportation
and preserve

assure the highest

in such a manner

the inherent

advantages

of,

degree of safety in, and foster sound

economic

conditions

relations

between

in, such transportation,

and coordinate

and improve

transportation

bv, air

carriers;
c) The promotion

of adequate,

economical

service bv air carriers

at reasonable

unjust discriminations,

undue preferences

or unfair or destructive

competitive

and efficient

charoes,

without

or advantages,

practices;

44 Referring
to the civil Aeronautics Authority which
was replaced by the CAB in 1940. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.

20

d) Competitionto the extent necessaryto assure the
sound developmentof an air transportationsystem
properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic
commerce of the United states, of the Postal Service, and
the national defence;
e) The regulationof air commerce in such manner as to
best promote its developmentand safety; and
f) The encouragementand developmentof Civil
Aeronautics.,,45
This multiple

and potentially

goals had a marked
regulation

and development
46

deregulation
balance

influence

•

promotion

In this regulatory
complicated
"competition
development

on the nature

its policy

statutory

of the industry

prior to

the CAB had to

objectives:

scheme competition

the

had a

requirement

to the extent necessary
of an air transportation
industry

of CAB

and its regulation.47

role. The legislative

that the airline

list of policy

of the industry

In formulating

the two primary

discordant

of fostering

to assure
system",

was expected

48

the sound
suggested

to benefit

from

45 civil Aeronautics
Act, section 102, 72 STAT. 740,
as originally passed. Subsequent amendments to the Act
till the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
and the International Air Transportation
Competition Act
of 1979 continued with the same policy statement except
for minor changes.
46

See qenerally,
REGULATORS (1962).
47

48

RICHARD CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS

See BROWN, supra note 3, at 51-54.
See supra note 45 and accompanying

text.

21
competition.
destructive

However,

the caveat against

competitive

practices",~

the advantages

of "improv(ing)

coordinat(ing)

transportation

mandate

to encourage

or

the recognition

the relations

and

and the

air transport,

on competition

of

between,

by air carriers",

and develop

the view that mere reliance

"unfair

reflected

would

not be

desirable.
Consequently

the CAB's attitude

was ambivalent

at best. Competition

was controlled

and regulated

be discouraged.
its regulatory
aviation

carrier

50

air carriers.
authority

into the regulatory

49

50
51

52

as trunk carriers,

to the

its
a policy

of

51

trunk airlines.

16 carriers

which had been

These carriers,

were primarily

Id.
supra note 3, at 53-54.

See supra note 23.

threat

Act of 1938 had "grandfathered"

framework

Id., at 55.

of the

them from directly

when the Act was passed.52

BROWN,

section

the CAB pursued

with the certificated

classified

the CAB to extend

By using

and prevented

The civil Aeronautics

operating

prompted

which posed a competitive

segregation

competing

was okay so long as it

reach to any unregulated

CAB certificated

competition

by the CAB. Or else it was to

This attitude

industry

classification

towards

engaged

in

22
scheduled

passenger

transport

transport

cargo and provide

The CAB created

United

(or Chartered)

Service,

54

states:

created

for carriers

Alaska,

and for international

permitted

structural
protected
granting

53

54

55

56

operating

to fly on domestic

classification

system,

development

carrier

classes

Local Service,

special

exclusively
carriers
55

Air Taxi and
were

in Hawaii

By this

of the industry,

trunk classification

and

who were not

the CAB not only influenced

the trunk airlines

for

Supplemental

classifications

routes.

to

service.53

All Cargo, Commuter,

In addition,

•

charter

six additional

the continental

Helicopter

but were also authorized

the

but it also

from competition

by not

to any new airline.56

BROWN, supra note 3, at 54.
Id., at 55.
Id.

Id., at 54-59. As a result the original trunk
airlines (whose number had reduced to 10 from 16 in the
intervening years) accounted for approximately 90% of the
domestic passenger market at the time of deregulation.
Moreover, the CAB was also very restrictive about granting
any of the other classifications to new airlines. Due to
this, by 1970 the eleven trunk airlines earned 86.5% of
the total industry revenue, while the nine local and
thirteen
supplemental airlines earned 10.3% and 1.3%
respectively. The CAB certified only two all cargo
carriers and their share of the total industry revenue was
a paltry 0.7%. The three helicopter services, two intraHawaii carriers and the four intra-Alaska airlines
certified by it accounted for a meager 0.1%, 0.6% and 0.4%
respectively. Though obtaining classification as a
commuter airline or an air taxi service was relatively
easy, severe restrictions on the type of aircraft and the
routes made them practically non competitive with the rest
of the industry. See also DOUGLAS & MILLER III, supra note

23

The CAB was more open to the idea of permitting
of existing

carriers

new carriers

into new city pair markets

into the industry.57 However,

entry

than of

its policies

in this regard were still very restrictive.58 Though
established
showing

airline

usually

was a "public

CAB would

normally

the incumbent

59

it.

divert

objected
traffic

Consequently,

served by another

not grant the necessary
on the ground

if they did not significantly
the incumbent

of fostering

improving

relations

relationship

the

certificate

hardship

routes were awarded

only

"sound economic

between,

conditions"

and

than it did to promote

among the carriers.

The resulting

the CAB and the industry

was

57 DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 22, at 113; BAILEY et
all, supra note 15, at 14.

59

MEYER & OSTER et all
Id.

of

on the policy

and coordinating

by air carriers,

between

stress

22, at 121-122; BAILEY et all, supra note 15, at 13.

58

if

for

affect the profitability

the CAB gave greater

objective

"competition"

carrier

airline.

Obviously

transportation

If the

that the new entry

and cause financial

competitive

air

that the there

need" for the new route authority.

route was already

of

and able" to provide

it still had to demonstrate

concerned

would

did not have the problem

that it was "fit, willing

transportation,

an

(1981), supra note 15, at 6.

24

paternalistic:
parental

the CAB "provided

support

a strong measure
Monopoly
applicant

and protection,
of parental

with

while exercising

control."

in turn,

60

route awards were often given to the

in the weakest

to strengthen

the industry

financial

that carrier

position

and maintain

in an attempt

stability

in the

. dus t ry. 61 Pro f 1
.t able routes were also awarde d to
ln

compensate
those

airlines

serving

policy

62

routes

its focus on overall

..

ln partlcular

was generally

like

The CAB's pricing
industry

rather than on the relationship

an d costs

competition

flew on uneconomic

small communities.

also reflected

profitability
f ares

which

markets.

63

between

•

Prlce

64

discouraged.

60

ROBERT C. FRASER, ALAN D. DONHEISER & THOMAS G. MILLER,
JR., CIVIL AVIATIONS DEVELOPMENT: A POLICY AND OPERATIONS
ANALYSIS, 67 (1972).
61
62

MEYER & OSTER et all, supra note 15, at 6.
Id.; BROWN, supra note 3, at 71.

63

This was prompted largely by the need to reduce
payment of subsidies on unprofitable routes. The Board
relied on "internal subsidization" of a carrier's route
system for this purpose. Revenue from a carrier's more
profitable routes was used to subsidize losses on
unprofitable routes. The internal subsidy strategy
eliminated the possibility of a carrier making an excess
profit on one route while requiring government subsidy on
another route, a practice which had the potential of
becoming a politicaL liability. BROWN, supra note 3, at
71.
64 Under
Section 902(d) of the civil Aeronautics Act
(72 STAT. 784), tariff violations were criminal offences
and there were very few instances of "illegal" price
cutting. Indeed, the CAB's across-the-board
fare
authorization provided a mechanism through which the

25

2.4

Limitations

to CAB Regulation

In spite of its vast authority
facets
under

of the airline

limitations.65

certain

requirements
routes

industry,

stipulated

almost

all

the CAB had to function

Firstly,

the due process

by the regulations

were time consuming,

Additions

to regulate

especially

for changing

in contested

to the route system were required

cases.

to be dealt

with on a case by case basis and the CAB rules did not
provide
result

for a general

overhaul

of the route system.

it had to rely on a piecemeal

shortcomings

in the route system.

Secondly,
observed

not unilaterally

This meant,

granted

or substantially

to it on economic

in effect,

certified

of its certificates,

revoke

grounds

that any increase

became

a permanent

Thirdly,

though

the CAB could compel

a minimum

number

feature

carrier

the CAB could

reduce

authorization

provide

to rectify

66

so long as a permanently

the conditions

authorization

approach

As a

the
alone.

67

in route
of the system.
a carrier

of flights between

68

to

a city pair or

airlines could act as members of a price-fixing cartel.
Once the price was approved it became binding on all and
the CAB assumed the role of enforcer of the agreement. See
JORDON, supra note 25, at 62-72; DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra
note 22, at 140.
~ BAILEY et all, supra note 15, at 11-14.
66

67
68

Id.
Id.

Id.
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to halt at one or more intermediate
prevent

an airline

CAB thought

"adequate".

either

increasing

bigger

aircraft

effective

from providing

stops,

more service

The carriers

the frequency

or by both.

69

means of controlling

it could not
than the

could do this by

of flights

or by using

The CAB, thus had no
the total capacity

of the

airlines.
The above features
with the CAB's policy
led airlines
70

flights
wine

of the regulatory

of discouraging

to compete

by offering

and on flight facilities
71

and entertainment.

airlines

also acquired

preference
72

suitable.
sooner

69

system,

price competition

greater

the latest models

The existing

than was probably

frequency

like gourmet

In order to attract

to older models,

coupled

of

food and

passengers

of airlines

in

even if the latter were more

aircraft

were also replaced

necessary.

much

The new aircraft

were

Id.; BROWN, su?ra note 3, at 92-93.

70

By offering more convenient schedules than its
rivals, a carrier tried to obtain a greater than
proportional market share. See PAUL BIEDERMAN, THE U.S.
AIRLINE INDUSTRY, END OF AN ERA (1982) 131.
71

72

BROWN, su?ra note 3, at 67, 92-93.

An example of this was the acquisition of wide
bodied jets. Biederman's study shows that the older narrow
bodied aircrafts did not suffer from any disadvantage due
to the introduction of the wide bodied aircrafts. On the
contrary, in the case studied by him the operator of the
narrow bodied aircraft effectively counteracted the
introduction of the new aircrafts by offering a more
convenient (and higher level of) service frequency,
another form of nonprice competition device. See BIEDERMAN,
supra note 70, at 126-130.
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generally

more expensive

capacity.73 As a result,
74

increased.
provided

airline

costs and capacity

But due to the CAB's pricing

the industry

airlines'

and had larger seating

profits

with an assured

operational

costs,

not benefit

through

the consumers

used by the airlines
competition

resulted

76

in lower

of the air services

for financing

the savings

further

The increased

the

affected.75

lower fares. Instead

strategies.

which

rate of profit,

were not significantly

Even where the new technology

policy

did
were

non-price

capacity

of the

n "(T)he carriers ... were driven to keep adding
aircraft until they were constrained by the inability to
finance new equipment or the inability of manufacturers to
supply more planes." JONATHAN L. S. BYRNES, DIVERSIFICATION
STRATEGIES FOR REGULATED AND DEREGULATED INDUSTRIES: LESSONS FROM
THE AIRLINES, 31 (1985); BROWN, supra note 3, at 93.
74

BYRNES, supra note 73, at 31, 58. This practice did
encourage the development of the u.S. aircraft
manufacturing
industry and lead to technological
innovations which allowed it to remain a leader in the
field. However the costs were fully borne by the consumers
of the u.S. airline industry.
75

The CAB considered selection of equipment, like
scheduling of aircraft, to be an "inviolate management
prerogative" and the use of new and more modern aircraft
"a legitimate method of management" for differentiating
an
airline product from that of its competitors. BROWN, supra
note 3, at 93, referring to Gellman, The Regulation Of
Competition In United States Domestic Air Transportation:
A Judicial Survey And Analysis, 28 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND
COMMERCE, 14 8, 161.
76 Since the rates for airservices was controlled,
there was little scope for individual airlines reducing
the same. Nor was it in the interest of the airlines to
show exceptionally high profits as that would invite
attention of the regulators and raise accusations of
"unreasonably high levels of profits".
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airlines

posed no problems

experiencing
adversity
severe

growth.77

was

But during times of economic

and low demand,

problems

when the industry

unless

excess capacity

the CAB stepped

could

lead to

in to bail them

out.

2.5

The Cyclic Nature
The airlines

general

economic

Of CAB Requlation

industry

is particularly

conditions

cycle.

In times of economic

travel

falls; during

paternalistic
during

78

periods

However,

CAB's regulation
during

when the industry

an anticompetitive

its

79

tended

CAB policy

went

and passenger

competition.

period

there

was deliberately

to assume

and procompetitive

demands,

Consequently,

of route, price and service

the 1938-1970

for air

prosperity

the industry,

decline

of high profits

liberal towards

the demand

of economic

to

in the business

In order to fulfil

of economic

anticompetitive.

was more

adversity

role and "protect"

periods

through

and the swings

periods

is a surge in air travel.

sensitive

79
80

BROWN, supra note 3, at 67.
Id.
Id.

the

competition
alternatively

character.8o

These

77 In fact it permitted
the airlines to take
advantage of increased demand for air services in the
short run. Since the price could not be increased in
response to the increased demand, the airlines could
increase their revenue only by carrying more traffic.
78

it
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cyclical

swings

in the CAB's policy

with the general

financial

cycles

In part, the CAB's policy
response
groups

to the increased

affected

groups,

financial
industry

pressures

security
approach
83

financial

with a large stake

of the major airlines,
to the question

adopted

in the
a pro-

of airline

They argued that the CAB's role was to

insure the financial

health

it was self sufficient

government

from various

regulation.82 Some of these

and other entities

regulation.

that

swings were also in

like the major trunk carriers,

institutions

corresponded

in the industry.81

political

by airline

roughly

of the industry

and not dependant

subsidy.84 Pressure

likely to be the strongest

and ensure
on

from these groups was

during periods

of economic

diff icul ties. 85
In contrast,
organizations
promote

low cost air services
86

82
83
84
85
86

like consumer

and small businesses,

to the pUblic.

81

other groups,

Interest

Id.
Id. , at 67-94.
Id. , at 60-61.
Id.
Id. , at 62.
Id. , at 63.

argued

that CAB should

that were widely

available

in air travel was heightened

30

when the economy
travel

was doing well and the demand

was high. 87

Each position
policies.

advocated

In general,

regulation

reflected

turns

However,

the CAB's

extent.

to manage

policy

institutional

constraints

and economic

When the economy

commercial

the next chapter,
its role during
necessary

opportunity

bring about

88

89

90

its ultimate

demise.

Id. , at 62.
Id. , at 62-64.
Id. , at 62.
See infra Chapter

3.

only to

took a plunge,
which

attempt

adversity

for the critics

it

As will be seen in

the CAB's unsuccessful

times of extreme

permitted

problems

really

air transport.90

also

role.89

it could no longer act as the "safety valve"
stabilized

strict

the two competing

about its regulatory

to deal with these political
a limited

set of

favored more competition.88

in its regulatory

the CAB's attempt

sets of expectations

its own distinct

the first group emphasized

while the second

Thus the cyclical

87

for air

to play

provided

of regulation

the
to

CHAPTER

3

THE TRANSITION

TO DEREGULATION

3.1

FOR REGULATION

RATIONALE
Economic

the ground
utility

regulation

of the airlines

that air transportation

which required

This claim rested

special

was justified

was a strategic

regulatory

for a regulatory

aviation

route networks

in order to ensure

neglect

and socially

desirable

agency

to design

the development

service

93

Without
airlines

91

on three basic assumptions~:

it was necessary

network.

public

treatment.

1) That

of an integrated

on

such route making,

would

it was argued,

fly only on the more profitable

routes with thin traffic.

that the benefits

Public

the
routes

interest

of air travel be uniformly

and

required

distributed

geographically.

91

See qenerall Y, P. CHERINGTON, AIRLINE PRICE POLICY, A
STUDY OF DOMESTIC AIRLINE PASSENGER FARES (1958); F. GILL & G.
BATES, AIRLINE COMPETITION (1947); S. RICHMOND, REGULATION AND
COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION (1961); Bluestone, The
Problems of Competition Amonq Domestic Trunk Carriers
(parts 1 & 2) 20 J. AIR L.& COM. 379 (1953), 21 J. AIR L.
& COM. 50 (1954)
92

93

BAILEY et all, supra note 15, at 1-2.
Id.
31

32
2) That to promote
service

network

the development

it was necessary

carriers

to operate

achieved

either through

the airlines
charging

To enable
be avoided

leads to duplication

integration.
airlines

industry

94

95

96

97

rd.

without

for such services.95
of

To ensure optimal

utilization

of

must be strictly

regulated.

it was considered
rights

or within

necessary

to

to carriers

on

particular

of such routes or regions
limited,

rd. , at 2.

rd.

was

industry

of economies

regions.96
in a country

this meant that entry

had to be severely

rd.

had to

the realization

routes

Since the number

and facilities

in the demand

or near monopoly

parallel

was necessarily

by

on a particular

in the airline

of services

For these reasons

certain

routes

Rate and route regulation

competition

increase

it prevents

grant monopoly

or by allowing

essential.

3) That unregulated

resources,

for

This could be

them to do this, price competition

thus considered

system

incentives

the uneconomic

and the number of airlines

corresponding

air

rates on more busy routes.

route had to be restricted.

Further,

routes.94

subsidies

to cross subsidize

higher

to provide

on uneconomic
direct

of the desired

restricted.97

into the

a

33

The grant of monopoly
necessitated
it became

regulation

essential

their monopoly

rights on routes

of rates.

to prevent

position

98

To protect

airlines

by charging

in turn also
consumers,

from exploiting

too high a rate. At

the same time the rates had to be fixed at a level which
would

ensure

earned

that the airlines

a "reasonable

such a regulatory
The report
aptly

scheme was obviously

when

it recommended

"It should

be the general

in the interest
development,
routes
hand,

while

avoiding

or duplication
too much

is enough

piece

first class
of folly.

Theoretical
While

service

paralleling

... On the other

to eke out a hand-to-mouth
traffic

to support

and one alone,

would

one

be a

,,99

Challenqe

to the Basis for Requlation

the CAB's regulatory

of the 1970's was largely

policy

till the beginning

in line with the this attitude

98

rd.

99

Report of the Federal Aviation Commission
in MEYER et all supra note 15, at 19.

quoted

of

can be as bad as too little.

existence
really

competition

and technological

uneconomical

airlines

there

and academic

in the airline

to promote

service

To allow half a dozen
where

of 1935

that:

of facilities

competition

Commission

in official

policy

of improved

in

limited.

of the Federal Aviation

about the role of competition

industry

their costs and

The scope for competition

summed up the consensus

circles

3.2

profit".

covered

of 1935,

34

towards

airline

expressed

competition,l°O doubts

in academic

such regulation.
asserted

circles

about the justification

As far back as 1951, Lucile

that there was no evidence

need for governmental

control

Eleven years
empirical

competition

would permit

largely

rational

when Michael

out the dramatic

the regulated

interstate

unregulated

100
See qenerally,

on the basis of

and predicted

that

in a 1965 articlelM,

difference
airlines

of scale

route choices.l~

Levine,

California

the basic assumptions

to show the

argued that the economies

level were insignificant

brought

available

Caves,

at a system

However,

Keyes

with skepticism.

later, Richard

evidence

of

over entry into the aviation

industry.l0l But this was greeted

more

began to be

in the performance

in the U.S.A.,

intra-state

for regulating

of

and the

airlineslw,

the airline

industry

BROWN, supra note 3, at 42-93.

101

L. S .KEYES, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR
TRANSPORTATION (1951).
102

R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS
STUDY (1962).
1M M. Levine, Is Regulation Necessary
Air Transportation
and National Requlatory
L. J. 1416 (1965).

AN INDUSTRY

? California
Policy,

74 YALE

lW Constitutionally
and statutorily, the CAB had no
authority over purely intrastate airlines which could be
regulated only by the state concerned. The Californian
airlines operated profitably at prices less than half of
those fixed by the CAB, without any governmental
assistance, and effectively competed with the CAB
certified carriers. Likewise, the texas intrastate
carriers, had lower fares. See MEYER & OSTER DEREGULATION AND
THE NEW AIRLINE ENTREPRENEURS 121-122 (1984).
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came under

serious

community.

A 1970 study by William

St reng

and widespread

.
th ene d Levlne's

models

Douglas

of airline

the airline
suggested

Jordon

further

observations,

and James Miller

competition

industry

by the academic

f'
lnd'lng. 105

Based on these empirical
like George

scrutiny

built sophisticated

in which they characterized

as naturally

that economic

economists

competitive

regulation

should

be

in 1975

107

and

.
t lnue
.
d .106
d lscon

Finally,

in a study published

Eads demonstrated
regulated

that in spite of CAB subsidies,

U.S. carriers

small communities.
communities
industry

Further,

These

107

and received
of

still served by certificated

was based more on carrier

was necessary

106

carrier

he found that the scheduling

at the communities

demand.

of

At the same time many of these

findings

one of the basic premises

105

large numbers

that had no rate or route regulation

carriers,
consumer

had abandoned

were being served by a commuter

no subsidies.
service

, George

convenience

effectively

for regulation,

to serve small communities

than on

discredited

that regulation
with

"thin traffic".

W.A. JORDON, supra note 25.
DOUGLAS & M ILLER, supra no t e 22 .

George C. Eads, Competition in the Domestic Trunk
Airline Industry: Too much or Too Little, in PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS (A.Phillips Ed.) 13-54
(1975) .
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Due to these and other works,
academic

consensus

had emerged

favoring

deregulation.

However

it is doubtful

without

simultaneous

and adequate

political

have been sufficient

to dismantle

the CAB's regulatory

108

structure.

As a result

circumstances

3.3

Support

Unpopular
The airline

traffic

demand

response,

.
carr1ers

•

consensus
support

would

opportune

support was forthcoming.

for Derequlation.

CAB Policies

industry

had experienced

unprecedented

from the mid 1960's till 1969.1W

the CAB pursued

liberalized

mere academic

of certa1n

this political

Political

3.3(i)

whether

by mid 1970's an

a pro-competitive

route and rate regulation

In

policy

and allowed

and
multiple

on some rou t es. 110 Due t'0 1ncrease d' a1r l' 1ne

profits

the CAB also permitted

certain

limits.

discount

pricing

within

l11

h
.. 1S often stated t hI'
Even tough
1t
at deregu at10n
was a triumph of academics, the political climate had to
be correct for the policy makers to heed this academic
consensus.
108

109 During
this "golden age" of air travel passenger
demand increased dramatically as the recreational travel
industry developed and jet equipment provided more
efficient and economical operations. See BROWN, supra note

3,

at 84.
110

Id.

111

Id., at 89-90; DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra note 22, at 9798.
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By 1969, however,
worsened

the economic

and the carriers

112

losses.

The excess

capacity

all these years caused
113

traffic

dwindled.

stress,

the CAB reacted

policies

and resorting

measures.

incurred

conditions
substantial

had
financial

which had been building

severe problems

as passenger

As in earlier periods
by reversing

up

of industry

its procompetitive

to several restrictive

114

Firstly

it imposed a "route moratorium"

to discourage

airlines

from expanding

with a view

their

.
115
opera t lons.
Secondly,
to encourage
schedule

it used its antitrust

the airlines

to negotiate

mutual

authority
flight

reductions.116

Thirdly,

following

the Domestic

Investigations,117 various
discount

exemption

pricing

Passenger

Fare

rate hikes and restrictions

were approved.

112
BROWN, supra note 3,

As a result,

on

average

at 99.

113
Id.
114
Id. , at 99-101.
115
116

Id. , at 99-101.
Id. , at 100.

117
The Investigations, which lasted from 1970 to
1974, were started after an industry fare hike approved by
the CAB was challenged in court by Rep. John E. Moss and
other Congressmen. Their primary purpose was to establish
standards for future rate decisions. See Lucile Keyes,
Policy Innovation in the Domestic Passenqer Fare
Investiqation 41 J. AIR L. & COM.75-100 (1975).
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. d US t ry f ares lncrease
.
d b y 20~
o'
•
ln
ln 1974. 118 Certaln

popular

schemes

like youth and family discount

fares were

.
t lnue
.
d .119
d lscon
Fourthly,
regulations

the CAB stepped

up enforcement

in order to prevent

.
t lng
.
d lver
passengers

charter

from sc h e dId
u e

also took the unprecedented

of charter

carriers

from

.
120It
opera t lons.

step of proposing

minimum

.
121
ra t es so as t 0 ma k e th em Iess compe t 1.t lve.

Ch ar t er

Finally,
mandating

the CAB sought to increase

airline

standards.1~

performance

It discouraged

operational

departure

from its traditional

towards

service

and efficiency

management

increased

profitability

practices

which

costS.1~ In a significant

competition,

offering

amenities

mandated

more efficient

laissez

faire policy

it sought to put an end to

like free movies

and beverages,

(and less spacious)

and

seating

.
t lons.
.
124
con f 19ura

118

note

BROWN, supra note 3, at 100, MEYER et all, supra

15, at 42.

119
BROWN, supra note 3,
120
Id. , at 100-101.
121
122
123
124

Id.
Id. , at 10l.
Id.
Id.

at 10l.

by
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3.3(ii)

Coalition

of Interest

Groups

Opposed

to

Regulation
These policies
unpopular
quarters.

and met with widespread
125

Smaller

and financially

the CAB of overstepping

interfering

with airline

restraining

their ability

The departments

more sound carriers
Airline

executives

its authority

management

by

functions,

to provide

ancillary

of Transportation

initially

not objected

reduction

agreements.

and by
services

and Justice

to the CAB's approval

128

But when the number

inter-carrier

agreements

the Antitrust

Division

increased

to

its anti trust exemption

had

of schedule
of such

they were challenged

on the ground

by

that the CAB was

authority.

125

note

from various

127

passengers.

abusing

to be highly

opposition

to the route moratoriums.126

objected
accused

of the CAB proved

BROWN, supra note 3, at 101-102;
15, at 31-41.

129

MEYER et all supra

126

note

BROWN, supra note 3, at 101; MEYER et all, supra
15, at 41.

127

128

129

BROWN, supra note 3, at 101.
Id.

Id.; In addition, by 1974 the list of opponents to
the CAB policies had extended to include the Postal
Service, the City of Chicago, the State of Maryland, and
the then Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
Lewis A. Engman. MEYER et all supra note 15, at 41-42 &

nl.

40

Consumer
flight

groups

frequencies,

.
t lnuance
.
d lscon

0f

protested

about rate hikes,

reduction

in flight amenities,

popu 1ar dOt
lscoun

carriers

charged

airlines

to eliminate

opponents,

low cost air travel.I:3l

unhappiness

with the policies

Deregulation

political

towns with thin traffic
program,

regulatory

interest

structure.

Basically,

groups

from the airline

representing

loss of services

in safety

standards.

131

rd.

132

rd. ,

of the

of deregulation

for regulating

services,

BROWN,

who had a

182

financial

within

the small

airlines

in the perpetuation

predicted

180

coming

then being served by a special

the opponents

age old arguments

policy

favored

and most of the CAB certified

strong vested

of the

had its fair share of

the major opposition

labor unions,

and

with the trunk

CAB did not mean that its every critic
derequlation.

in

fares. 180 Supp 1emen t a 1

the CAB of conspiring

This universal

drop

the industry

chaos, deterioration
to smaller

They were

the framework

of CAB.

the

and

of the quality

communities

in favor of changes

supra note 3, at 101.

at 104-105.

advanced

of

and drop
in

41
3.3(iii)

Political

However

the opponents

disillusionment
influential
rallied

Scandal

with CAB grew and respected

politicians

around

soon lost ground

and powerful

as the
scholars,

interest

the call for deregulation.

groups

On top of this,

the then chairman

of CAB, Robert Timm, got involved

political

in 1974 owing to his connections

scandal

the Nixon Administration.1~
brought

The Watergate

out that two major airlines

contributed

to Nixon's

reelection

that Timm was instrumental

inquiry

into this.

revealed

1M

trips to Florida,

had illegally

Bermuda

and it was

in thwarting

To make matters

that Timm had accepted

with

investigations

campaign

alleged

in a

worse,

airline

and several

a CAB

it was

hospitality

on

European

.
135
coun t rles.

3.3(iv)

Congressional

The combination
policies

Scrutiny

of political

drew the attention

scandal

of Congress

of the CAB. In early 1975, Senator
Chairman

of the Senate Judiciary

Administrative

133

Practices

Id. , at 10I.

134
Id.
135
Id.

and unpopular

to the functioning

Edward Kennedy,

Sub Committee

initiated

an oversight

on

42
investigation
hearings

into CAB policies.

provided

deregulation
his support

various

Kennedy

by Senator Howard
Sub Committee

bills for reform

one jointly

were

139

opposed

on Aviati~n.

to deregulation:

The proposed

compensation

program

by Senators

and guaranteed

system

Canon and
provisions

two politically

bill included

of the

138

of the regulatory

airline

lent

This

137

Chairman

The bill contained

to mollify

communities.

deregulation.

Cannon,

sponsored

introduced.

which were designed
groups

Soon Senator Kennedy

for the move towards

Commerce

including

forum for those advocating

of the industry.

was followed
Senate

a public

The Committee

136

influential

labor and small
an airline

service

labor

to small

communl.t'les. 140

3.3 (v)

Presidential

Endorsement

At the same time, regulatory
priority
Shortly

reform was given top

by both the Ford and Carter administrations.
after becoming

Cannon-Kennedy

President,

bill and galvanized

Carter

endorsed

various

groups

the
in favor

136 Committee
on the JUdiciary, u.S. Senate, 94th
Congress, First Session "Oversight of the CAB Practices
and Procedures.
137

138

139

140

BROWN, supra note 3,
rd. , at 110-114.
rd. , at 114-115.
rd. , at 115.

at 101-102,

107.

43

of deregulation

to form an alliance.

into an unprecedented
a diverse
interest

coalition
groups

deregulating

3.3(vi)

political

Administrative

Cornell

University

on the matter

individuals

forces to support

the industry.

In the meanwhile,

This snow-balled

consensus

of influential

joined

141

as

and

legislation

for

142

Deregulation
the CAB, under the stewardship

Professor

of Economics,

Alfred

of

Kahn,

,
If Ie d t h e movemen t t owar d s d eregu Ia t'10n. 1~ In a
1tse
manner

most uncharacteristic

its extinction,
approximating
Congress

the CAB zealously

By the middle

legislation,

141
142

implemented

rate and route deregulation

agency

facing

policies

even before

a reform bill.u4

had passed

implemented

of a regulatory

of 1978 the CAB, on its own accord,

most of the provisions
thereby

had

of the pending

giving policy makers

and legislators

Id.
Id., at 102, 115.

143

Kahn's predecessor John Robson had also proposed a
deregulation experiment but it was not accepted. As CAB
Chairman, Robson had also testified before the Cannon
hearings in favor of reducing CAB authority and placing
more reliance on market forces. See, BROWN, supra note 3,
at 117.
144

49-52.

Id., at 116-119; MEYER et all, supra note 15, at

44
a preview

of how a deregulated

airline

industry

was likely

.
145
t o func t lone

3.4

Derequlation
Fortunately

competitive

policies

in the economy
airline

for the deregulators,

and the airline

profits

dispelling

soared

Finally,

from the airlines
Deregulation

.

lndustry.

aviation

deregulation
international

As a result

of

by June 1978, major opposition

had also ended1~ and the Airline

extension

Presidential

to deregulation

was the liberalization

aviation.

assent

of
of

were also in favor of a competitive
airline

industry. 150The International

Air

145
BROWN, supra note 3 , at 126.
146
Id. , at 126.
147
148
149

in

of domestic

Indeed the proponents

to

improvement

149

A natural

international

146

consequences

Act of 1978 received

1978.

commercial

with a general

in 1977 and 1978, thereby

fears about adverse

deregulation.l~

October

coincided

the CAB's return

Id. , at 118.
Id.
Id. , at 123.

150
For a discussion of the proposal of former CAB
Chairman, Alfred E. Kahn on this issue, see RAMON DE
MURIAS, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INTERNATIONALAIR
TRANSPORTATION, 153-157 (1989).

45
151

Transportation

Act of 1979

coun t erpar t

. l'
th e Alr
lne Deregu 1a t'lon Act. 152

0f

The Act envisaged
international

carriers

CAB regulation

airlines

the integration

air transportation.1~

"international"
under

routes.

international

system however,

access

if benefits

carriers

of

enforced

to fly on u.s.

Due to the nature

of air traffic

increased

and

was done away with and all u.s.

could now seek permission

exchange

of domestic

The segregation

and "domestic"

international

only

was the international

which

rights,

by foreign

of the

is based on bilateral

the Act contemplated

carriers

to the u.s. markets

of a similar magnitude

were afforded

by

.
.
154
th e concerne d forelgn
governmen t s t 0 U.S. carrlers.
The International
the market

and promote

u.s. carriers.
tolerated
similar

Act, thus, though professing
competition,

Competition

did so only for the

from foreign

airlines

only to the extent u.s. airlines

advantages

in the foreign

to open up

country

was to be

could get
concerned.

151Pub. L. No 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (codified
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.)

in

1~ It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss
the International Air Transportation Act or the
international repurcusions of deregulation of the American
airline industry. For a discussion of the same see DE
MURIAS, supra note 150, 147-193, and sources cited
therein.
1~ International Air Transportation competition Act,
section 17, amending section 1102 of the Federal Aviation
Act. See DE MURIAS, supra note 150, at 166.
154

Id., at 166-175.
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3.5

Chanqes

brought

Requlatory

3.5(i)

about by "Derequlation"

structure

Phased Termination
The Airline

phased

airline

of direct
industry

the CAB itself on January
period

practices

Act of 1978 contemplated
economic

to prevent

155

was to be accomplished

Regulation

of carrier

agreements

was to end by January

whether
Board

the public

155

156

to Congress
interest

of

reliance

0f

on

rou t e
31, 1981.

and inter-carrier

I, 1983. The CAB was

by January

require(d)

beyond January

See BROWN supra note 3, at 123.
Id., at 125.

abolition

by December

fares, mergers,

and its functions

of the

anticompetitive

"
. Termlnatlon

regulation

to report

a

I, 1985. During the transition

and to place the highest

.t lve
.
compe t 1
mar k et forces

required

control

with the eventual

the CAB was directed

airline

of CAB

Deregulation

termination

domestic

to the

I, 1984 "as to

continuation
I, 1985.

,,156

of the
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3.5(ii)

Residual

Powers to Department

On its termination
residual

powers

transferred

on January

1, 1985, the CAB's

and responsibilities

to the Departments

state and the Postal

Service.

of Transportation

were to be

of Transportation,

Justice,

The administration

of the

small-community

service program

Transportation,

which was to also work with the State

department
Postal

on international

Service

regarding

mail transport.

antitrust

of Justice.
September

However

as any other

The

industry.

of baggage

d epar t men t

0f

passed

in

to the

too. This authority,

1, 1989, when the airline

however,

industry

laws in the same manner

The CAB Sunset Act also allocated

consumer

regulation

of the CAB's

to the department

this authority

to the antitrust

the CAB's residual

157

authority

the CAB Sunset Ace58

of Transportation

be subject

for the transfer

exemption

was to end on January
would

agreements.

157

1984 transferred

department

air service

was to get the CAB's responsibilities

The 1978 Act provided
residual

was to go to

protection

handling

functions

and booking

like

rules to the

Transpor t a t·lone 159

Id.

158

civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub.
Law No 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703.
1~
This aspect of CAB's responsibilities
had been
omitted through oversight in the 1978 Act leading to a
jurisdictional
struggle between the department of
Transportation
and the Federal Trade Commission. The

48

3.5{iii)

Requlation

of Safety and Technical

Matters

Unchanqed
No change was made by either Act to the regulation
airline

safety

The authority
Aviation

for this purpose

Administration.

Thus
industry
meant

or to the technical

"deregulation"

economic

did not mean that the airline

regulation,

decisions

be influenced
influence

like other industries.
the airlines

would no doubt

by the remaining

regulations.

But such

to the general

granted

exemption

getting

approval

The airlines

antitrust

would

laws though

from prosecution
of the Department

also be

they could be

under the same by
of Transportation

till

date.

The Theoretical
The regulatory

based on certain

expected

In the

making

subject

airline

to

but were left to make their

would be indirect.

the "sunset"

It essentially

would no longer be subject

of such decision

3.6

with the Federal

was now freed of all regulation.

own economic
course

remained

of aviation.

(F.A.A.)

that the airlines

direct

aspects

of

Basis of Deregulation

scheme substituted

basic assumptions

competition.

by deregulation

about the nature

Based on these assumptions

that the market

would perform

a better

was

of

it was
job of

Sunset Act ended the controversy in favor of the Dept. of
Transportation.
BROWN, supra note 3 at 125.
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regulating

the industry than was possible

regulatory

structure.

Airline

3.6 (i)

Markets Are Highlv competitive

The justification
entry regulation

for doing away with rate, route and

was based on economic

characterized

the airline

and suggested

that its performance

control would approach
These theories
inferences

without

that under perfect

based their predictions
observed

competitive

regulatory
competition.1OO
on certain
characteristics

airline markets.

3.6(i} (a) Cost-less

Entry And Exit

First, the ability of airlines
rent ground

theory which

industry as highly

drawn from empirically

of existing

under the CAB's

facilities

major maintenance

to lease aircraft,

and equipment,

repairs and services

and to contract
suggested

out

that they

could expand or reduce the size of their operations
without

significant

obviously

mobile,

geographical
airports

sunk costs.
operations

constraints.

and airways,

161

since aircraft

were

were not bound by

Moreover

as airlines

there were no substantial

160

used public
infra-

See e. q., S.BRYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM, 317 -318
(1981); Levine(1965} supra note 103; DOUGLAS & MILLER, supra
note 22; JORDON, supra note 25; CAVES supra note 46; Keeler,
Airline Requlation and Market Performance, 3 BELL J. ECON &
MGT. SCI, 399 (1972) .
161

See e.q., CAVES, supra note 46.
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structural

expenses.

From this it was concluded

that entry

into and exit from the industry was easy and virtually
costless.

3.6(i) (b) No Economies
Second,

studies

Of Scale

by some authors

that there were no significant
airline

industry,

technology.1M
entrants
account

162
had suggested

economies

and all airlines

in the

had equal access

This led to the conclusion

to the industry

of scale

to

that new

were at no disadvantage

merely

on

of their size.

3.6(i) (c) Lower Prices,

Lower Costs And Hiqher

Capacity

utilization
Third,
markets

such as the California

markets,
chartered
airlines

actual performance

of relatively
and Texas

as well as the less regulated
markets
resulted

seemed to suggest
in reduction

unregulated

interstate

markets

like the

that competition

of excess

capacity

among

leading

162
See e.q., Id., at 56; M. STRASHEIM, THE INTERNATIONAL
AIRLINE INDUSTRY 90-101 (1969); Gordon, Airline Costs and
Manaqerial Efficiency, in TRANSPORTATIONECONOMICS (National
Bureau of Econ. Research, 1965); White, Economics of Scale
and the Question of "Natural Monopoly" in the Airline
Industry, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 545 (1979).
163Id. In fact the evidence seemed to suggest that
after remaining constant for a wide range of airline
sizes, the unit cost per available seat mile actually rose
for the largest airlines.
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to lower costs, lower prices and higher volume of air
travel.

164

Cumulatively
scale,

ease of entry, lack of economies

lower prices and better utilization

economistsl~
industry

to predict that deregulation

would result

low cost producers,
competi tion166,
successful

of capacity

perfectly

competitive

3.6(ii)

Airline

survival

of wasteful

and an absence of opportunity

predationlM:

led

of the airline

in cost based pricing,

disappearance

of

of

service
for

in short, a replication

of a

market.

Competition

And The Theory Of

Contestability
One problem with this theoretical
reconciliation
observed

of the perfect

phenomena

had only a handful
theory,
result

164

competition

that even "unregulated"

the possession

with perfect

See Levine(1965)

was the

model with the
airline markets

of firms. As per conventional

this suggested
incompatible

framework

orthodox

of market power,

competition.

su~ra note 103; JORDON,

This awkward

supra note

25.
1~

See e.g., DOUGLAS
(1965), supra note 103.
166

Encouraged

167

Because

& MILLER

supra note 22; Levine

by CAB regulation.

of few start up or sunk costs.

a

52

fact was generally

ignored by or glossed over by these

wr~.t ers. 168
After the formulation
contestability,W9
Unlike

orthodox

did not require
allowed
required

of the theory of

this problem
competition

seemed to be resolved.

theory,

contestability

a large number of competitors.

for economies

theory

It also

of scale. All that the theory

was that

1)

firms could enter and exit without

costs,

2)

all firms had equal access to economies

of scale and

to technology,
3)

there was no scope for operating
predation

4)

losses due to

or other forms of "strategic"

conduct,

and

there was a set of prices that could occur after the
entry of at least one firm which would support
profitable

operation,

i.e., the condition

of

sustainability.
If these conditions

existed,

be able to offer an immediate

potential

entrants

supply response

would

whenever

the

168 Keyes,
for instance, used the "monopolistic
competition" model to characterize the airline market but
predicted behavior that was competitive. See KEYES, supra
note 102; Levine used the perfect competition model but
predicted, on the basis of observed reality, that
deregulated airline markets would have a limited number of
competitors. See Levine (1965) supra note 103.
169

See WILLIAM BAUMOL, JOHN PANZAR & ROBERT WILLIG,
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982);
BAUMOL, PANZAR & WLLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE: REPLY, 73 AM. ECON. REv., 491 (1983).
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incumbent

producers

competitive
output.
compel

prices

The threat
incumbent

attempted

to charge higher than

or produce

lower than competitive

of such potential

producers

levels approximating

competition

to maintain

would

price and output

those to be expected

at

in competitive

markets.
The characteristics
studies

of the airline

with the requirements
Consequently,
theory

in the years

seemed

to further

of numerous

immediately

confirm

projections
problems"

assumptions

deregulation

these predictions.
into the industry

and the resulting

or to external

boom in air

the stand of the profrom their earlier

attributed

faced by airlines

went by it became

lead to

industry.l70

following

The few deviations
were shortly

deregulation

would

fall in fares, entry

new carriers

theory.

used the contestability

in the airline

seemed to vindicate

deregulators.

seemed to fit perfectly

of contestability

equilibrium

The dramatic

in pre-deregulation

that deregulation

Events

travel

industry

some economists

to predict

competitive

observed

to "transitional

trying to adjust
factors.

increasingly

to

However,

as more time

clear that many of the

about the nature of the deregulated

airline

170See Bailey & Panzar, The Contestabilitv
of Airline
Markets Durinq the Transition to Derequlation, 44 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 125 (1981); Bailey & Baumol, Derequlation
and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J ON REG. 111
(1984), BAILEY ET ALL supra note 15, at 153-72.
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industry

were contrary

to reality.

examine

some of these assumptions

airline

industry

regulation.

has actually

The next chapter

will

and how the deregulated

fared in the absence

of CAB

Chapter

4

The Functioning

Of The Airlines

Deregulation
industry.

had a profound

As administrative

demolished

After Deregulation

action and legislation

the former regulatory

had to alter their competitive
old, time-tested
the established
circumstances

effect on the airline

restraints,

strategy

the airlines

fundamentally.

methods were of little utility
carriers

The

now. As

grew familiar with the changed

they evolved strategies

to remain

in

dominance.
While some of these strategies
the major airlines
the challenge
entrants
priced

were remarkably

failed, by and large
successful

in meeting

posed by the low costs and prices

of the new

to the industry. As these much publicized

carriers

swallowed

left the arena one by one, bankrupt

up by a bigger firm, the euphoria

days of deregulation
there was something
projections

essentially

or

of the early

gave way to a solemn realization

of the advocates

that

wrong with the theoretical

of deregulation.

Most of these projections
characterization

low

of the airline

55

were based on the
industry

as "naturally"

56
competitive

or contestable.

subsequent

events have cast serious doubts

of such characterization.
assumptions

deregulation

and the manner

has actually

functioned.

impediments

on the accuracy

This chapter will examine

of the major

major

But, as will be seen below,

and expected

results

of

in which the airline

It will then discuss

to contestability

some

industry

some of the

which have developed

or come into focus after deregulation.

4.1

Kev Assumptions

4.1(i}

and Actual

CAB certificated

Outcome

Carriers

Would Be Compelled

To

Brinq Down Costs And Prices To New Entrant
Levels
Firstly,

Or Perish

it had been assumed

lower costs and higher
established
market

carriers

unless
171

levels.

171

that new entrants

flexibility

would

soon overtake

and reduce their dominance

the latter brought

The CAB certificated

with
the

of the

down costs to new entrant

airlines

had entered

the

See e.q., MEYER & OSTER supra note 45, at 136-137
("(t}he pressures placed on the established carriers to
reduce their costs ... (have) come from the realization
that with deregulation very low fares based on very low
costs are no longer confined to the intra state markets
and are certain to spread to many or even most markets ...
Not only are new entrants likely to grow and expand, but
... established carriers (will have to) lower their costs
in response to new entrant pressures." See also, BAILEY et
all, supra note 15, at 91-110; Keeler, su?ra note 171;
Levine, Financial Implications of Requlatory Change in the
Airline Industrv, 49 S. CAL. L. R. 645, 655-57 (1976).
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deregulation

era improperly

competition.

Most established

labor unions

and high labor costs.1n

routes,

designed

equipped

for a world of free

carriers

under CAB regulation,

had entrenched
Almost

were high density

linear routes which were highly vulnerable
.t 1.on.
.
178
compe t 1.
Several
aircraft
whereas

and equipment
new entrants

in accordance
compounded
several

established

suitable

found themselves

older aircraft

contractual

and corporate

for long haul routes,
equipment

needs. This disadvantage

obsolete.1U

Together

was

they placed

cost on the established
commitments

these airlines

carriers.

raised costs further.

also inherited

culture conditioned

of CAB regulation.

a management

by the protective

On account of the CAB's policy

ensuring

a fixed rate of profits,

airlines

had got used to employing

promoted

growth rather than profits175•

178

with

by the steep rise in fuel prices which made

Finally,

172

to low priced

had the option of choosing

with emerging

a costly re-equipment
Previous

carriers

all their

luxury
of

the CAB certificated
strategies

which

Such a management

MEYER & 0 STER supra no t e 104 , a t 201 -.202
BYRNES, supra note 73, at 56 (1985).

174

MEYER et all, supra note 15, at 161-188 (the fare
increases made almost one quarter of the nation's jet
fleet capacity economically obsolete).
175

BYRNES supra note 73, at 62.
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style was likely to be inappropriate
With all these handicaps,
fare miserably
changed

in the new set up.

these carriers were expected

unless they could adapt quickly

circumstances

to

to the

and bring prices to the level of new

entrants.
Many of these carriers,

however,

while adapting

substantially

to the new conditions continued to survive
in spite of above market costS.176 On the other hand,

practically

all of the new entrants,

their advantages
organization,

in terms of costs, equipment

CAB certificated

Inteqration
Secondly,

or merged with one of the former

carriers.

No Incentives

significant

For Mergers And vertical

Of Air Services

it was believed

economies

that since there were no

of scale in the airline

there would be no incentive

for mergers

consolidations.l77 It was also posited
be no incentive
services.l~

and internal

failed to survive for long. Sooner or later

they either went bankrupt

4.1(ii)

not with standing

for vertical

Rather,

176Levine(1987),

and

that there would

integration

it was asserted

industry

of air

that integration

of

supra note 14, at 407.

177See e.q., CAVES, supra note 46, at 56-61.
178

The term "vertical network integration" in the
context of airlines has a somewhat different meaning than
the traditional use of the expression "vertical

59

higher

density,

lower density
combinations

longer haul operations

operations

with shorter haul,

would be inefficient

would impose the higher overheads

as such
and labor

costs of the former on the latter. Indeed, one of the
expected

benefits

reallocation

of deregulation

of resources

was believed

from the less profitable

airlines

of the CAB era to independent

carriers

having cost structures

of the industry.

deregulation

consolidations
tendency
trunk

for each segment

have been belied. The years

integration

contractual

several major

There has also been a strong
of international,

line and regional/commuter

through

suitable

have witnessed

and mergers.

towards

specialized

179

Both these expectations
following

to be the

arrangements

services,

domestic

normally

which entail code

integration". Traditionally, vertical integration refers
to the common administration by ownership or contract of
different stages of production and/or distribution. The
different stages of the transportation of an airline
passenger from a small town through a connecting hub to
another destination, whether a major metropolitan city or
another small town or to an international destination, are
regarded as the different stages of the transportation
process as each has very different technical and
administrative features. Due to the technical and
administrative differences such a journey is similar to
journey using a multi-modal means of transportation.
Vertical network integration occurs when these different
stages of transportation are carried on under a common
administration either through common ownership or through
contractual arrangements. See Levine (1987) supra note 14,

at

437 &

n

151.

179 See G. EADS, THE LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINES EXPERIMENT, 3174 (1972).
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sharing,

coordinated

scheduling

and shared market

.den t 1..t y. 180

1.

4.1{iii)

Linear Route structure
continue

Thirdly,

prevalent
markets,

assumption

was that the linear route structure

would be the dominant

competition

structure

was believed

to be discrete

to this expectation

airlines

have

the linear route system, and
on "hub and spoke"

182

Derequlated

Markets Would Have Simole. Uniform

Fare structures
Fourthly,
resulted

city pairs.

deregulated

instead have relied almost exclusively

4.1{iv)

under

too. 181 In other words, the basic venue for

more or less abandoned

systems.

of the proponents

under the CAB, as well as in the intrastate

deregulation

contrary

Under CAB Would

After Derequlation

an underlying

of deregulation

Prevalent

Based On Costs

the highly complex

after deregulation

fare structure

which

could not be reconciled

with

180

See D. PICKERELL & C. OSTER, A STUDY OF THE REGIONAL
AIRLINE INDUSTRY: THE IMPACT OF MARKETING ALLIANcEs 2, (1986);
Levine (198?), supra note 14, at 410-411.
~1
182

Levine

(198?) supra note 14, at 411.

Id."Hub and spoke" systems concentrates most of an
airlines operations at one or very few "hub" cities
serving all other cities non stop from the hub. The cities
on the spoke are provided connecting service through the
hub.
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either the perfectly
contestable

competitive

market model or the

market model of the airline industry.

models visualized

simple, uniform pricing based on the

costs of the new entrant airlines.u3
and other types of restricted
considered

These

"Discount"

discriminatory

fares

pricing were

to be a result of market power created by the

.. I en t ry con t ro I'
•
ar t 1.f lcla
s lmpose d bIt'
y regu a 10n. 184 Slnce
entry into and exit from the airline industry was believed
to be more or less costless,
expected

to remain after deregulation.

assumption
demand

•

Another underlying

with regard to this pricing model was that the

for air travel was similar among most travellers,

i.e., all travellers
prlce.

no such market power was

were equally sensitive

to changes

in

185

Together,
a relatively

these two factors were expected

simple and unrestricted

to produce

price system.

186

183 Id., at 413; Peter C. Carstensen,
Evaluatinq
"Derequlation" of Commercial Air Travel: False
Dichotomization. Untenable Theories. and Unimplemented
Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109, 119-110 (1989).
U4 A limited
amount of cost based price
discrimination, like higher peak time rates was however
visualized.

185 MEYER et all, supra note 15, at 56. (Congressional
study based on assumption that unrestricted regular fares
would prevail after deregulation; Carstensen, suora note
88, at 109-110.
186 See Hearings
on the Oversight of civil Aeronautics
Board Practices Before the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the
JUdiciary, 94th Congress 1st Session (1975) (Kennedy
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This conclusion

was further

the intra state markets
the charter

by observations

in Texas and California

such as Peoples

low fares introduced

Express

to support

immediately

this analysis.

after deregulation

When discount

in spite of the rock bottom prices

entrants,

they were regarded

away.

188

by which residual
It was predicted

market

disappear

price

would

be forced

to lower their costs and simplify

structure

or perish.1~ However

fare structure

of these new

power was being competed

that the complex

eventually

pricing

as part of the adjustment

structure

complex

as well as

by airlines

persisted

process

of

market. 187

The unrestricted

seemed

fortified

as the airlines
their

would

fare

not only is the highly

very much in vogue today but

contrary

to what was anticipated,

offering

the unrestricted

it is the new entrants

low fares which have ceased

to

exist.

Hearings) at 35, 52 (testimony of Thomas
Antitrust Division, Dept. of Justice.)

E. Kauper,

187See, Levlne
. ()
1965 supra no t e 103; MEYER & OSTER,
supra note 104, at 21-24.
1M Or, in the terminology of economists the
"tatonement" process whereby prices are adjusted mutually
over time to reach equilibria. Levine (1987) supra note
14, at 414.
1~ See Call & Keeler, Airline Deregulation, Fares and
Market Behavior, in ANALYTICAL STUDIES IN TRANSPORTATION
ECONOMICS, 221 (A. Daughety Ed., 1985); MEYER et all, supra
note 15, at 71-72.
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4.1(V)

Insignificant

Role Of Freauent

Travel Aaents And Computerized

Flyer Proarams.
Reservation

Systems
Another
analyst

development

had not anticipated

flyer programs,
systems

which the pro-deregulation
was the central role frequent

travel agents and computerized

(CRS's) would play in the deregulated

reservation
airline

. dus t rYe 190
1n

4.1(v) (a) Frequent
When American
program

Flyer Programs
Airlines

in 1980 many observers

.
t 1ve
.
mar k e t·1ng 1ncen
Such bonuses
airline

monopolistic

0ft'
no

considered

been really competitive

it have been required
position

have become an integral

has been compelled

irrespective
monopoly
whether

of whether

191

or contestable.

However,

enjoyed

feature of the industry.
virtually

every

to offer such programs
of

routes due to its hub and spoke systems,

or

it offers a relatively

low and non-discriminatory

And, in general,

Levine(1987)
Id., at 414.

a

these

it has a large proportion

fare structure.

190

191

had the

if an airline

in the market.

flyer

it to be a

.. f 1cance.
.
par 1CU Iar s1gn1

In spite of some initial reluctance,
carrier

the frequent

should not have been necessary

industry

Nor should

programs

introduced

the benefits

su?ra note 14, at 414-416.

of the

64

program

are available

purchase

regardless

of whether

full fare or discounted

tickets.~2

passengers

4.1(V) (b) Role of Travel Agents
Deregulation
of travel
airlines

agents

was also expected
in the distribution

were expected

discriminatory

fare structures

methods

on direct marketing
However,
the enormous
frequent

particular
result,

the role

Since the

non-

at the lowest feasible

that they would also adopt

of distribution193
and dispensed

the constantly

which emphasized

with "middle men".

and rapidly

changing

fares,

range of fares for the same journey and

changes

of evaluating

system.

to adopt simplified

cost, it was anticipated
alternative

to diminish

in routes and services

the "best bargains"

time very complex

has made the task

available

at a

for the lay traveller.

As a

the need for travel agents has grown and there has

been a tremendous
sales through

increase

in the percentage

travel agents.

of air ticket

194

192 Which excludes
any simple explanation which would
justify the benefit on the basis of the cost of the
ticket.
63

194

Levine(1985)

supra note 14, at 414.

See BRENNER et all, supra note 15, at 62 (travel
agents' share of total domestic and international air
travel sales rose from 47% in 1973 to 57% in 1978 to 74%
in 1983. The total commissions paid increased from $ 732
million in 1978 to $ 2.4 billion in 1983.)
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4.1(v) (c) Computerized
Finally,

Reservation

though Computerized

(CRS's) had started operations
the deregulators

apparently

Svstems
Reservation

systems

even before deregulation,

never anticipated

the pivotal

role the airline owned CRS's would play after deregulation
and the various ways in which they could be manipulated

to

"bias" the system in favor of the airline owning the
CRS. 195 The frequent
airline

changes to a complex

fares, flight schedules

system of

and ticketing

procedures

has made the CRS's indispensable.
However
received
offered

CRS's have been used to distort

by travel agents and consumers
by rival airlines

rides and other incentives
the tickets
airline

information

about service

as well as for providing

over

to induce travel agents to sell

of the airline owning the CRS.1OO If an

is the owner of the dominant

city it can place its competitors
disadvantageous

CRS in its own hub

in a very

position.

65 Levine(1987)
supra note 14, at 415. The travel
agents use the CRS to get flight and fare information for
its customers, issue tickets and boarding passes and
provide ancillary services such as rental car and hotel
reservations. Either due to economies of scale or due to
contractual terms, the agency usually uses only one
system.
66 See Unl't ed A'
, 'I Aeronau t'lCS Boar d ,
lr I'
lnes v. C1Vl
766 F. 2d 1107, 1110 (1985). The issues raised by the
CRS's is discussed in the next chapter.
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Predatory

4.1(vi)

standard

Conduct Under Deregulation

deregulation

analysis

predation

would not be of concern

market.197

It was believed

predation

could simply withdraw

to operate
predator

had assumed that

in the airline

that an airline targeted
from the market

and refuse

below cost, and then resume service once the

raised

fares to compensatory

the post deregulation
cost airlines

levels.

reducing

till the new entrant
from the route.

199

However,

their fares to a level apparently

is financially

suggests

that, contrary

practices

are prevalent

to raise the same

exhausted

This sort of behavior

in the airline

rate wars followed

reflection

of this fact.

or withdraws

strongly

to what was expected,

periodical

Levine(1987)

198

period abounds with cases of higher

lower than its costs and then refusing

"7

predatory

industry

by increase

and

in fares are a

supra note 14, at 417.

198 Id. This belief
was based on the assumption
entry and exit were costless.
199

for

that

Id.; BRENNER et all, supra note 15, at 33-50;
Newspaper reports also periodically feature stories about
fare wars. See e.g., When does a Competitor Cross the Line
to Predator?
Investors Business Daily, June 17, 1992
(reporting the filing of suits by continental Airlines and
Northwest Airlines claiming that American Airlines had
engaged in predatory pricing in order to drive them out of
business); Fare Wars Are Becoming A Way Of Life, Bus. Week
Jan 13, 1986, at 102; The Airlines' Dangerous Games with
Fares, Bus. Week Mar 5, 1984 at 33.
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4.1(vii)

Deregulation

The proponents
existing

antitrust

And Antitrust

of deregulation

exclusionary

fall within

or exploitative

antitrust
conduct,

it was asserted

laws. Moreover,

The actual

to these expectations.

mergers,

consolidations

concentration
route

systems,

apparent

predatory

have raised
market

200

serious

200

The tendency

and contractual

flyer programs,

conduct

power by the airlines

towards

integration

has

of hub and spoke
instances

and the dominance

concerns

seems

era. The resulting

with the evolution

frequent

by the

would be dealt with by

in the deregulation

coupled

If at

that such

after deregulation

contrary

been very strong

prohibited

it was assumed

machlnery.

experience

that

(and transparently)

of conduct

if and when it occurred,

.t rust en ft'
th e an t 1
orcemen

be sufficient

conduct would be rare.

it would necessarily

the categories

would

that the

issue that could arise under

To begin with,

all it occurred

had assumed

laws and procedures

to deal with any antitrust
deregulation.

Enforcement

of

of the CRS's

about the possession

of

and the antitrust

See BRYER, supra note 160, at 32; Cohen, The
Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 28
ANTITRUST BULLETIN 131, 139 (1983); Eads, Airline
Competitive Conduct in a Less Requlated Environment:
Implications for Antitrust, 28 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 159, 17983 (1983); Keyes, Notes on the Historv of Federal
Requlation of Airline Merqers, 37 J. AIR L. & COMM. 357
(1971); Phillips, Airline Merqers In The New Requlatorv
Environment 129, U. PA L. REV. 856, 876-79 (1981); White,
supra note 162, at 545, 546 (1979).
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implications
however,

of the same. The antitrust

has proved

these matters.

4.1(viii)

largely ineffectual

machinery,
in dealing with

201

Bankruptcies.

Debts And Leveraged

Buyouts

The high levels of debts and the remarkable
bankruptcies

witnessed

deregulation

have been beyond the expectations

deregulators.
through

Bankruptcy,

inefficient

a matter

by the airline

industry.

More competitive

firms may be expected

since
of the pro-

in itself, when it is caused

management

of grave concern

industry

stream of

of operations,

might not be

for the overall health of the
and advantageously

positioned

to take over the assets and put them

to better use.
If the number of firms are small, however,
resulting

concentration

raise apprehensions
also warrant
bankrupt

of the industry

of abuse of economic

an investigation

company's

the

can legitimately
power and may

to find out whether

plight was a result of inept management

or was the consequence

of predatory

tactics

employed

the "bigger

fish", or of any other feature of the

deregulated

industry.

Indeed part of the financial
seems to have originated
have erupted

201

the

problems

from the frequent

ever since deregulation.

• f ra Chap t er 5.
See 1n

by

of airlines
rate wars that

The financial

over-

69

reaching

by some of the rapidly growing new entrants

also have contributed
External

factors

economic

conditions,

may

to some of the bankruptcies.

like increase

in fuel prices,

increased

re-equipment

like, are also partly responsible

adverse

costs and the

for this state of

affairs.
While a certain amount of financial
to be expected
unregulated

as the industry

environment,

in which the industry
contemplated.

instability

sought to adjust to an

the precarious

financial

The assumptions

of mobility

of capital

shareholders

and creditors,

such new entrants,

has also dissuaded
Thus potential

type of investor

- the corporate

to the industry.

of concentration

investors

Instead,

202

from

theory was
a different

raider - has been

Encouraged

by the high levels

in the industry and the depressed

stocks,

to the

competition

on which the contestability

seems more and more unlikely.

of airline

and

airlines

aside from causing distress

from funding new airlines.

attracted

not

before they reached the stage of bankruptcy.

The bankruptcies,

based,

health

finds itself today was certainly

cost less entry and exit ought to have permitted
to pullout

was

and lured by the prospect

value

of

~2 As airline earnings
are subject to cyclical swings
stocks normally sell at a discounted price as compared to
the stock markets normal price-to-earnings
ratio. See
Michele M. Jochner, The Detrimental Effects of Hostile
Takeovers. Leveraqed Buyouts. and Excessive Debt on the
Airline Industrv, 19 TRANSP. L. J. 219, 225 (1990). At
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profitable

liquidation

like air craft,
aircraft,
assured

of the airlines

spare part inventories,

deposits

on airplanes

of earning

system,
monopoly

1everage d buy ou t s

and landing

0f

serviced

takeover

bear substantial
bid. In either

airline.

airports,

have attempted

through

Even where

the incumbent

expenses

heavy debt,

a takeover

management

is left to

in order to repel the takeover
ends up with a mountain

it to take such undesirable

down or postponing

changing

and

means that the debt has to be

of debt. This in turn forces

expenditure,

slots at crowded

are financed

event the airline

steps as cutting

dates on

severa 1··maJor alr l'lnes. 204

by the targeted

bid is unsuccessful,

assets

computerized

rents,W3 these raiders

since these attempts
a successful

delivery

and real estate,

by its hub and spoke systems,

reservation

undervalued

the company's

essential
capital

re-equipment

structure

times of financial uncertainty in the industry,
prices are likely to be further depressed.

by

the stock

203

See Id., at 225; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Robber
Barons in the Cockpit: The Airline Industry in Turbulent
Skies, 18 TRANSP. L. J. 133-34 (1990). Dempsey also
attributes the power and glamour of owning an airline as a
motivating factor for the takeovers.
204

See qenerally, Dempsey, supra note 203; Jochner,
supra note 202. During 1989, three of the four largest
airlines in the United States, Northwest, United and
American, became targets for leveraged buyouts, loading
them with enormous debts. Four others which had become
victims of leveraged buyouts, Continental, Eastern, Pan Am
and TWA ended up with negative net worth. Eastern and Pan
Am have gone bankrupt while TWA and Continental are on the
verge of bankruptcy.
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expenditure,
reducing

changing

equity

and increasing

assets

like buildings

crafts

and equipment

The problems
leveraged
industry

debt,

the earlier
attracted
interested
corporate

in the airline
launches

shake up the market

air

to the airline

of much controversy

of such attempts

entrepreneurs

by deregulation,

raider

fixed

take overs and

has been particularly

airline

by

them on lease.

by hostile

are not confined

But the effects
industry

structure

liquidating

and then taking

and has been the subject

205

capital

and taking them on rent, selling

created

buyouts

debate.

airline

the company's

and

on the

disturbing.

Unlike

and the "new entrants"

the corporate
business.w6
a hostile

raiders

are not

Quite often,
tender

the

offer merely

and drive up the airlines'

to

stock price

205 See e.g., Easterbrook
and Fischel, The Proper Role
of a Tarqet's Manaqement in Respondinq to a Tender Offer,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (takeovers are beneficial as
they lead to more efficient allocation of resources by
substituting competent management in place of incompetent
management); Ginsburg & Robinson, The Case Aqainst Federal
Intervention in the Market for Corporate Control,
Winter/Spring
1986 BROOKINGS REV. 9, 11-14 (takeovers
foster national growth); But see Lipton, Take Over Bids in
the Tarqet's Boardroom: A response to Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1231, 1233
(1980) (economic benefits of takeovers are debatable); R.
GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 1059-60
(1986) (takeover of local companies poses real threat to
local interests); Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age
of Finance corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 125
(1987) (adverse impact of takeovers) .

206

As one observer notes "the aviation industry right
now is being run and acquired by financiers - not aviation
people" Blum, So Is It Really Safe To Fly?
Nat'L L. J Oct
2, 1989 at 26 (comments of Richard F. Schaden)
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stock.207 Their primary
make quick personal

(and often sole) purpose

profits

at the expense of the airline.

As such they are not concerned
viability
extract

is to

with the long term

of the airline and their actions are designed
as much as possible

shortest

possible

in the

time.~8

Even if the targeted
bankruptcy

from the company

to

and manages

airline can momentarily

avert

to limp along with its unproductive

207Jochner, supra note 202, at 226; See qenerallY
Dempsey, supra note 203. Dempsey cites a two instances:
Denver oil king Marvin Davis launched a $ 2.7 billion bid
for Northwest Airlines. Northwest ultimately fell victim
to a $ 3.7 billion bid by Alfred Checchi while Davis
enjoyed a $ 30 million profit on the Northwest raid.
Similarly, Francisco Lorenzo collected $ 46 million as
"loser's compensation" after he had launched a hostile
take over attempt of National Airlines in 1979. {Pan Am
ultimately acquired National for $ 400 million through a
"white knight" non hostile acquisition.) Lorenzo then
launched a take over bid to acquire continental which he
finally did in 1982. This was followed by acquisitions of
Peoples Express and Eastern Airlines.
208For an account of the manner in which these
corporate raiders have ransacked the airlines they
acquired through leveraged buyouts
see qenerallY Dempsey
supra note 203; Jochener, supra note 202. Francisco
Lorenzo, who entered the airline industry via Texas Air
rapidly acquired several airlines through hostile
takeovers and promptly went about the task of bleeding
them to bankruptcy. Philip Baggeley, Vice President of
Standard and Poors Corp. describes Lorenzo's modus
operendi thus: "Mr. Lorenzo has built one of the most
leveraged major corporations in the nation while
insulating Texas Air - and himself - for most of the cost
and much of the risk ... Mr. Lorenzo presides over some of
the nations sickest airlines. All are losing money at some
of the fastest rates in aviation history and rank as the
industry's biggest debtors." Hearinq on Leveraged Buyouts
and Foreiqn Ownership of Airlines Before the Aviation
Subcommittee on Public Works and Transportation,
101st
Cong., 1st Sess (1989) (statement of Philip Baggeley).
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and back breaking
expected

burden of debt, it can hardly be

to regain

Starved

its former competitive

of funds it is compelled

maintenance
reduces

and re-equipment

its competitiveness

same time it becomes
competition

strength.

to cut down on essential

expenses which further
and compromises

extremely

vulnerable

as well to changes

safety. At the

to aggressive

in economic

climate

or

technology.
It is doubtful
visualized

whether

the disastrous
raiders.

addressed

in the deregulation

of economic

At least the possibility

would have subscribed

management
should,

means of displacing

be encouraged.

signs of an inefficient

sufficient

the theory that hostile
allocation

successful

~9

However,

in view
School

inefficient
of resources

Resistance

management

management

take overs

and

to the take

would be regarded

wishing

as

to entrench

.209

However

better

was not

to the view that hostile

and attain better allocation

therefore,

by

it seems likely that many of them

over bid by the incumbent

.t se If
1.

literature.

buyouts

of many of them to the Chicago

thought,

are a significant

of deregulation

effects of leveraged

corporate

of the affiliation

the proponents

evidence

exists today to discredit

take overs invariably

of resources

and the result of a

bid is to substitute

See e.q., Easterbrook

lead to a

a more efficient

& Fischel,

and

supra note 205.
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productive

management

inefficient

in place of the (presumably)

and unproductive

incumbent.21o

It certainly

. th e a1r
. I'1ne 1n
. d us t rYe 211
d oes no t seem t 0 b e th e case 1n

Airline

4.1(ix}

Safety

Another major assumption
economic

deregulation

of the deregulators

would not affect airline safety. For

almost two decades safety regulation
prerogative

of the Federal Aviation

CAB had no direct responsibility
abolition

was considered

deregulators

had been the
Agency

(FAA). As the

for aviation

inconsequential.

did not admit of the likelihood

necessary

in the deregulated
to supplement

safety,

its

Since the

in the safety equations which would warrant
safeguards

was that

of any change
additional

era, it was not considered

the powers or resources

available

to the FAA.
While considerable

controversy

extent to which developments
affected

still exists as to the

after deregulation

have

airline safety, there is a growing consensus

the deregulators

handicapped

the FAA considerably

2W See e.a., Lipton(1980},
Lipton(1987} supra note 205.

that

by not

supra note 205;

211 As Jochner notes II (t}he service of needless
debt,
brought about solely because of takeover speculation and
individual greed, surely is not the optimum use of
society's capital. These transactions serve merely to
rearrange capital; they do not create capital." Jochner,
supra note 202 at 222.
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enhancing
tasks.

the resources

available

to it for performing

its

212

4.1(x)

Scarcity

Of Gates And Slots will Not Impede

Contestability
The proponents
importance
slots,

of availability

scarcity

of a competitive

facilities

airline

of a factor of production
facility),

impediment
contestable
efficient

however,

to contestability.
market

realized

the

and transferability

gates and other airport

functioning

airport

of deregulation

of airline

to the

system.21:3 Mere

(i.e., the scarce

was not considered
It was believed

an
that in a

the firms which could make the most

use of the scarce slots and gates would be able

21 ')

- See qenerally, J. NANCE, BLIND TRUST: THE HUMAN CRISIS
IN AIRLINE SAFETY (1986); Carstensen, supra note 88; See
also Safety and Rerequlation of the Airline Industry,
Hearings Before the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation,
100th Congress 2d Sess (1987) at 33
(statement of T. Allen Mc Arbor). However statistical
studies based on airline accident rates show no increase
in accident rates. In fact the rates have declined, a
result attributed to better technology and not to
deregulation.
See e.g., Clinton V. Oster, Jr. and C. Kurt
Zorn, Is It still Safe To Fly, in TRANSPORTATION
SAFETY IN
AN AGE OF DEREGULATION
(Leon N. Moses & Ian Savage Ed.,
1989), 128.
213

See BAILEY et all, supra note 15, at 180-184 ; D.
Grether, R. Isaac & C. Plott, Alternative Methods of
Allocating Airport Slots : Performance and Evaluation
(1979) (study prepared for the civil Aeronautics Board by
Polionomics Research Laboratories, Inc., Pasadena,
California); Levine(1965) supra note 103, at 1417.
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to purchase
214

owner.
owners
entry.

it by paying

the "market"

Even the vertical
and slot owners,

215

airline

would not impede

transferable.

it by paying

So what mattered

slot was scarce but whether

airline

to another

user the first airline

to be able to obtain

was

its present
was not that the

it was freely

216

The possibility
utilized

between

If a slot or gate was more valuable

user the "market price".

needed

integration

it was argued,

than to its present

supposed

price to the

or unused

of an airline

airport

slot to another

it to enter the market
217

not selling

airline

was considered

which

irrational

and not admitted.

But although

slots was permitted

for some time in 1983 and has been

legal since April
reluctant

214

buying

its under

1986, the airlines

to share its airport

Levine(1987)

and selling

of

have been extremely

facilities

with their

supra note 14, at 465-466.

215

Id. (referring to R. BaRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX,
228-31, 240-42 (1978) : vertically integrated firm
maximizes overall profit by selling output at each level
as though the units were independent of each other)
216 Since airport
facilities are controlled by local
public authorities, rules about subleasing or transferring
varied. The solution suggested for the access problem was
to make airport facilities easily transferable and avoid
long term leases. See BAILEY et all supra note 15, at 184.
217 See BaRK, supra note 215, 228-31,
240-42 (vertical
integration for the purpose of blocking entry was
irrational as it incurred diseconomies.)
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218

competi tors
counters,
avoided

The airlines

•

gates,

making

have held on to their ticket

ramps and hangar

them available

space and have often

to other airlines

even when

they were not using them and had no plans of using them in
the future.

4.2

219

Airline

Competition

Orqanization

Theory

The deregulation
exceptional
surprises

and the "New Industrial

degree

experiment

of academic

of deregulation

has attracted

and policy

of airline

competition.

In general,

growing

consensus

that airline

markets

Contrary

there are certain
which

characteristics

218

barriers

Levine(1987)

there

of the

is a

previously,

of the airline

to contestability.

These

are not "naturally"

to what was believed

set up or enable an established

substantial

interest.

has led to a reevaluation

nature

contestable22o•

an

airline

markets

to set up

These

supra note 14, at 466.

219

Id.; See also BAILEY et all, supra note 15, at 192193 (cites two cases : a) Laker Airways inability to get a
gate or terminus space at JKF Airport even though National
Airlines had unused space suitable for this purpose and b)
TWA's reluctance to sublease space to Eastern at Los
Angeles. )
220 See e.g., LeVlne
•
() 1987
, supra no t e 14; Ca 11 &
Keeler, supra
note 189; (contestability theory
inappropriate for analyzing deregulated airline markets) ;
Marius Schwartz, The Nature and Scope of Contestability
Theory, in STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION (D.
Morris, D. Sinclair, M. Slater & J. Vickers Ed., 1986);
BAILEY, supra note 15, at 153-171.
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characteristics

has used the "new industrial
identify
account

several

economics

of airlines

to exploit

conventional

perfect

the airline

industry.

223

created

effects

ignored

and contestabilty

are discussed

models

Economies

information

about routes,

of

below.

Information

the cost of developing

and

by

And Communicating

Exhibit

by

such as the

Costs Of Developinq

First,

221

factors

which were

market

Some of these factors

4.2(i)

Most of them arise on

principle-agent

indivisibilities

who

theory,,222to

of scale and scope

of information,

production

by Levine

organization

of these barriers.

of the economies

the ability

221

have been highlighted

Of Scale And Scope

and communicating

schedules,

seat availability,

Levine(1987) , supra note 14 at 444-480.

222
The new industrial organization theory has
developed from the works of economists like Frank Knight
[F. KNIGHT, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1951); F. KNIGHT, RISK
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921)], Ronald Coase [R. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); R. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L & ECON, 1 (1960)], and in a
more modern context, Oliver Williamson [OLIVER WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONSOF CAPITALISM (1985)]. It focuses on
the relationships between the firm and the various
economic actors interacting with it, and on the strategies
employed by them to achieve their respective objectives at
the minimum cost.
223Economies of scale refer to advantages resulting
from the gross size of the airline. Economies of scope
refer to advantages enjoyed by an airline from a wide
variety of airline products offered in a large number of
markets.
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service

features

and prices

airline

industry. 224While any new business

has to incur expenses
information,~5

An airline

must make consumers

reliability,

with the customer
awareness.

creating

of communication

of reliability

the customer

generally

specific,

so that advertising

different

characteristics

it
as

"Each contact

The investment

Airlines

and services

level of safety.

delivery.

signif icantly

These costs are

in the market

The repetition

where

for this purpose

longevity

is cumulative,

as reassurance

business

such

aware not only that it

of prices

probable

and an acceptable

serves

required

but also of such service

schedule

enterprise

or "sunk" costs.

and of the package

offers,

in the

and disseminating

high for a new airline.

also non-recoverable

place

for packaging

the investment

is exceptionally

exists

are considerable

memory

and

over time

and durability

in a

pays before

in communication

is highly

by one airline

brand

does not

benef it another,,226
sell under the same brand name many

products,

such as different

fare and service

224Th ese ln
. ft'
orma lon costs are no t th e on 1y cos t s
which an airline has to meet. A new airline, even one
which intends to run its operations with leased aircraft
and facilities, must incur certain non-recoverable
"ramp
up" costs. See Levine, Airline Deregulation: A
Perspective, 60 ANTITRUST L. J. 687, 688 (1992).
225 See St'19 1er, T h e EconomlCS
.
POL. ECON. 213

0 f In ft'
orma lon, 69 J.

(1961).

226Levlne
. (1987 ) , supra note 14, a t 427.
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types,

in different

city pair markets.

sold to many customers
Filling

travel

in many different

the seats requires

with geographically

dispersed

metropolitan

newspapers

much more efficient
to the widest

service

From this,
network

•

audlence.

do exhibit

of information

over one offering

to these economies

also makes

it cheaper

to offer

the public

associates

already

of service.

it easier

product
customer

227

economies

the

of scale.

with a large

of products,

is at a

a limited number of

for it can spread

well known airline

makes

product

its

costs over a much larger range of services.

In addition

standards

providing

that a big airline

and fare types,

communication

make it

of scale, the costs of

and a wide variety

advantage

large

227

economies

information

it follows

destinations

television,

the cost of physically

of routes

distinct

of public media,

to offer more than one airline

may not display

communicating

with diverse

The indivisibilities

and network

possible

Thus, though

simultaneously

customers

with the most efficient

are

locations.

communicating

needs using a common medium.

associated

These products

These

to its service as

it with broadly

"economies

acceptable

of scope" also

to offer an additional

to a person who has already

Id., at 429.

for an established,

increments

for an airline

who buys a business

of scale the economics

ticket

used it. The same
between

Atlanta

and

81
New York may want to travel
Atlanta

to Orlando

from Atlanta

later on a leisure

or on an international

to Paris. Once the consumer

familiar

with an airline

by using

it for more than one service.

In such a situation
wide network
likelihood
customer

is again at a decisive

subsequently

4.2(ii)

advantage

with a

as the
which

the

even partially,

such advantages,

a new entrant

investment

large amount

in information

of non

generation.

Thus

of scale and scope act as a considerable

to contestability.

Principal-Aqent

to exploit

the customer

period

is the attempt

the "principal-agent"

due to the difficulty
case the employers

Effects

factor which has shaped developments

in the post deregulation

behavior

airline

costs

To

The second major

airlines

on search

is much greater.

economies

impediment

ticket

wants

must make a disproportionally
recoverable

from

has become

of it being able to offer the service

counteract,

these

excursion

she can economize

an established

ticket

by the

problems

on the part of principals

created

(in this

of persons

travelling

on business,

of air tickets,)

to monitor

the opportunistic

of their agents

and the travel

(the employee

agent booking

the ticket

and

flying on business,
on behalf

of the

82
customer) .~8 The extremely
fare structures
practically
their

complicated

of the deregulated

impossible

employees

business.

Likewise,

for the journey.

This provides

this situation
agent

structures,
increases

efforts

to even profit
indulge

The airlines

whether

(i.e., shirk)

frequent

programs

on
airline
agent

available

for these
agent)

to

or, when

of their

in opportunistic

have successfully

incentive

ticket

and the travel

at the expense

by designing

and cost

her travel

possibilities

it

whether

for an average

her the least expensive

their search

principals(i.e.,

travel

it is difficult

(i.e., the employee

possible,

to monitor

when they travel

to check with certainty

is in fact giving

reduce

has made

always use the most efficient

mode of transportation

"agents"

airlines

for employers

effective

customer

and ever changing

behavior).

taken advantage
flyer programs

of
and

with non linear reward

in which the value of the award per mile
as the total number

increases.2~

In addition,

of miles

flown

they also provide

higher

228The principal-agent
problem is not specific to air
transportation.
The problem was identified by Knight in
1921. See KNIGHT(1921) supra note 222, Ch 8. For a modern
treatment of the problem see Ross, The Economic Theory Of
Aqency: The Principals Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134
(1973); See also, Alchian & Demsetz, Production,
Information, Information Costs and Economic Organization,
62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) iFor a general survey of
principal agent literature see Rees, The Theory of
Principal and Agent (Parts 1 & 2), 37 BULL. ECON. RES. 3
(1985), 37 BULL. ECON. RES. 37 (1985).
229

•

Levlne

(1987), supra note 14, at 432-433.
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rewards

for more expensive

programs
agents

exploit

the principal

an incentive

"artificial"

destinations

of scope.

offered

for the participants
desirable
While
offer

231

awards'

smaller

frequent

agent problem

of scale presented

structure

from economies

enables
230

by an airline

or "specialist"

airlines

or travel

further

.

can, and do,

frequent

overrides,

generate,

to a large

So by designing

"artificial"

it becomes

agency

as compared

and inventing

of

to earn the more

of scope these programs

have created

and scope which

the easier

212

with a wide network.

big airlines

the

to benefit

, and the more attractive'

flyer programs

schemes

by giving

The larger the number

they are at a big disadvantage

incentive

These

by the non

the airline

of these programs

due to the economies

airline

of tickets.

to "cheat" or "shirk" while the

economies

linear reward

classes

travel

agents

flyer programs,

economies

impede the contestability

of scale
of the

markets.

230

Id. at 432-433, 452-458.

231

Incentive programs for travel agencies are
designed to reward travel agents both for increase in
market share in particular city pairs and for increase in
total business generated by the agency. Due to the non
linear award structure a travel agent would find it more
advantageous to book passengers on airlines offering a
wider variety and larger volume of services.
232 A wide array of destinations
not only enables
customers to accumulate sufficient miles to get a desired
award faster it also gives her greater choice regarding
which city to fly to. This flexibility adds to the
attractiveness
of the scheme.
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4.2(iii)

Production

A third barrier
indivisibilities
•

233

palrs.

to contestability

involved

An airline

3 flights

Indivisibilities

in serving

to achieve

acceptance.

More frequent

competitive

edge to an airline

provide

service

on search efforts.

airline

market

often gives a
customers

to

At the same time it must also

size. The central

in the industry

city

minimal

as it allows

an air craft of a minimum

available)

particular

must be able to offer at least 2 or

a day in a market

economize

is the

"acceptable"

problem

(or

of traffic

scheduling

is how to fill all these seats so that the

generates

sufficient

revenue

to make

its services

viable.
The hub and spoke system
technique
allow

of overcoming

frequent

density

would

systems

create

service

these

is an efficient

and useful

indivisibilities

so as to

in many city pairs whose traffic

not otherwise
genuine

support

benefits.~4

it. Hub and Spoke
But they also impede

contestability.
Due to these

indivisibilities

seats on the same flight
different
extract
customer

233

234

prices.

in a number

need to sell

of markets

While doing this the airline

the highest
groups

airlines

possible

it combines

Levine(1987),

revenue

aims to

from the different

on the same flight.

supra note 14, at 434-436.

Id., at 441-444.

and at

To do this
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the airline

must be able to do two things.

be able to develop
better

a sufficiently

still a system of multiple

customers

wishing

First,

large hub operation

to travel to different

destinations

it must be able to efficiently

principal-agent

problems

i.e., customers

not price

sensitive.

that frequent
passengers.
attract

flights

spoke system,

determines

business.

very

economies

with its ability

235

Obviously

hub and

to

of scope and scale described
of success

of production

of competitive

large scale.

segments by

and size of an airline's

it has in reducing

inherent

This means that if a new entrant

in a position

will be able to

fares.

the degree

the indivisibilities

means

fewer

in the price sensitive

in conjunction

exploit

who are

high yield traffic
with

the

high yield

travelers

It also means that the airline

them cheaper

effectively

like business

can be supported

Thus, the existence

above,

of the

exploit

in order to attract

Attracting

more passengers

offering

from

of information."

Second,

traffic,

(or

hubs) to be able to tap

the same spoke city and to reap the advantages
"economics

it must

strength,

in the airline
wishes

to enter

it must do so on a

this implies

that a new

235 As Levine
observes, "(an) airline large enough to
exhaust production indivisibilities
at even a medium sized
city hub is already a pretty big airline. None of the
(medium sized) cities being used as a hub ... supports
more than two such airlines, and most support only one. A
would be entrant at a hub city must therefore be prepared
to displace an incumbent. At the other end of the scale,
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entrant

is placed

production

4.2(iv)

at a major disadvantage

by these

divisibilities.

The Need For Vertical

Network

Integration

and

Code Sharing
Traffic
typically

originating

convenience

made

longer journey.

passengers

same airline

normally

As a matter

prefer

Since the incremental

to an already

functioning

sense for the major airlines

systems

journey

of

to travel

on the

for both the short and the long haul part of

journey.

passengers

for small towns

have to fly the short haul leg of their

as part of a much

their

at or destined

to try to tap this major

cost of adding
hub system

operating

such

is low it

hub and spoke

source of feed by adding

236
the small towns to the hub and spoke system ..

But the small number
towns and the "production
made
these

it totally

of passengers

indivisibilities"

uneconomical

to provide

towns.~7 Technologically,

efficiently

in individual
in this case

jet service

to

these towns were more

served by the commuter

airlines

using their

the same situation is created with respect to entry into a
spoke market large enough to support only one airline
offering the minimum level of service in jet aircraft of
minimum size for any given set of traffic flows. An
entrant in such markets must completely displace the
incumbent." Levine(1987) , supra note 14, at 444-445.
236

237

Id., at 437-441.
Id., at 439.
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small propeller
238

labor.
seemed

driven

Vertical

aircraft

integration

through

to be good way of getting

traff ic and not compromising
But the biggest

advantage

the same economies
The vertical
reservation

partner,

this valuable

on operating

integration

involved

identified

above.

sharing

network

of a common
offered

strategies

as an associate

by

of its major
and also

in the set up of the commuter

identifiable

239

came from

the services

common marketing

some changes

it more visibly

feed

efficiency.

of such integration

as part of the service

adopting

long term contract

of scale and scope described

code which

the commuter

making

and non-unionized

to make

of the major

airline.
Such an arrangement
allowed

the major

economies

airline

source

benefitted
"convenient"

account

238

239

from adding

The airline

of feed traffic.

by economizing
connection,

of the journey

of the
towns

was also assured

of an

The passengers

by getting

also credited

It

the smaller

costs involved

in looking

for a

the short haul portion

to their

with the major airline,

Id.,

well for everyone.

to take advantage

of scope arising

to its route network.
important

worked

frequent

flyers

and by getting

easier

at 440.

By retaining their separate legal status the
airlines
could take advantage of the lower labor costs of
the commuter airlines and avoid the complications of
.merging union and nonunion staff.

88

connections
gained
major

to cities

as they also received
airline

for bookings

of the journey.
advantage
national
with

served by it. The travel
commission

overrides

from the

made on the short haul portion

And the commuter

of the economies

agents

airline

arising

could also take

from marketing

under a

brand and being part of a major route network.

such obvious

advantages

part of the major airlines

there was a scramble

to get commuter

on the

partners

soon virtually

every major commuter

t·le d t 0 one

th e maJor
.
.
1 alr
. l'
na t lona
lnes 240 an d th e

0f

same position
However,
producing
raised

continues

considerable

airlines,
ability
system

existing

for the parties

240
241

integration,
involved,

or potential,

to set up or maintain
at the same location

while

also

to entry. The arrangements

feed from the commuters

hub or at a hub positioned
traffic

of vertical

barriers

took away or preempted

was tightly

till today.

this process

efficiencies

airlines

and

thereby

to other

affecting

a competitive

as the acquiring

their

hub and spoke
firm's

own

so that it served the same

flowS.241

See qenerally,

PICKEREL & OSTER, supra note 180.

Levine(1987) supra note 14, at 441. Alfred E.
Kahn, Market Power Issues in Derequlated Industries, 60
ANTITRUST L. J. 859, 860 (1992).
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4.2 (v)

Complex

Fare structure

As the major airlines
dealing

grew more sophisticated

with the information

deregulated

intensive

era, they devised

by following

a policy

of targeted

management,,242. Their frequent
most attractive
fares.

inventory

aircraft

them on different
When

environment
to maximize

pricing

revenue

or "yield

flyer programs

management

capacity

tied the

terms to different

they took advantage

programs

enabled

into sub units and sell
market

faced with price competition

on any route,

of the

awards to the use of less discounted

Computerized

them to divide

methods

in

segments. 243

from new entrants

of their economies

of

information

to match the fare levels of their new entrant

but offered

them on more restrictive

price

the customer

better

which

was likely to choose

known airline.

controls

on apparently

were priced

Such capacity

terms. At the same
the bigger

They also introduced
"unrestricted"

hidden

discount

at or below the new entrant's

controls

enabled

and
capacity

tickets
prices.

them to sell only that many

242This type of pricing structure which is the result
of price discrimination according to the differences in
customers' elasticity of demand, is known as "Ramsey
Pricing". See generally, Ramsey, A Contribution to the
Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. (1927). For a journalistic
account of how discriminatory prices are used by airlines
to maximize revenue see Off Course, The New York Times,
Sept 1, 1991.
243Levlne
. ()
1987

, supra no t e 14, a t 449-450.
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tickets

at discounted

rates within

rates as could not be sold at higher

a certain

black out time. It also allowed

them to vary the ratio of tickets
on different

controls

substantial
major

entrant

and market

required

segmentation

schemes

flyer programs

and smaller

airlines

computerized
obtaining

similar

While the new

could and did also follow

market

systems

intelligence.

on a particular

disproportionately
just to ensure
customer.

higher

What emerged

a relatively

Such a price

higher

of the

As the rivals

tickets

flight,

the major

could

would be sold

it had to sell a

of discounted

were complicated

which allowed

fewer passengers

tickets
sensitive

and ever changing
airlines

total revenue

to

while pricing

out of the market.
structure

to the contestability

244

number

structure,

them from

that it did not lose any price

fare structures
achieve

price

prevented

not be sure of how many discounted
by the incumbent

agents

access to the databases

reservation

The

reservation

suit and have their own "discriminatory"
the lack of immediate

based on

and travel

had both of these244•

computerized

capabilities.

with their computerized

frequent

incentive

such a strategy

and real time informational

airlines,

systems,

prices

terms for each flight.

To be effective
inventory

sold at different

constitutes

of airline markets

Id., at 451-452.

a major

obstacle

as they enable

91
the incumbent
selectively
without

airlines

to respond

to the prices

conferring

and outputs

a similar

already

burdened

by the economics

of information,

information

cheaply

and

of new entrants

advantage

The new entrant,

and incomplete

quickly,

to the latter 245 .

with the costs

imposed

has to rely on guess work

to react to the incumbents

prices.
Moreover,
spoke system
operation
it becomes

as an incumbent

can spread

easier

hub and

and costs of

it does not face competition,
for it to earn sufficient

revenue

to increase

markets

where

it faces competition

from the new entrant.

The incumbent

can use this ability

to maintain

flights

the frequency

in the face of vigorous

use that frequency

to attract

d e 1e t·
erlous

on

e fft·
ec

The cumulative
been to reduce
handful

1t s

of its flights

of mega carriers

.t
compe t lor.

of airlines
who dominate

computer

reservation

246

Id.

systems

to a

of any small new
route networks

of the largest

of the majority

has

the U.S. skies and

Even among them, the extensive

Id.

with further

in the industry

entrant.

245

and to

246

to repel the challenge

with their ownership

frequent

price competition

passengers,

in

effect of all the above factors

the number

are in a position

)

its overheads

over routes where
relatively

with an established

and

three along

of airport

slots in

92

the country
compared

has placed

to the rest of the industry.

been accused

conduct

have

in

with a view to oust the relatively

carriers.

This situation

has led to demands

antitrust

enforcement

machinery

has not been encouraging.

discuss

These airlines

time and again of indulging

anticompetitive
smaller

them a very strong post ion as

but the record

some of the antitrust

in the wake of deregulation
for the ineffectiveness
machinery.

for strong

of the enforcement
The next chapter

concerns

will

which have arisen

and try to analyze

of the antitrust

the reasons

enforcement

CHAPTER

5

ANTITRUST

ENFORCEMENT

The widespread
enforcement

AND THE DEREGULATED

concern

was brought

in the following

airlines.

dominance

was enacted there were 23

••. Today

antitrust

laws has permitted

of three glaring barriers

largest carriers,

reservation

the
the

systems by the very
flyer programs

into using only the largest carriers,

the unfair allocation
airports

policy of

to competition:

the growth of frequent

that lock customers

size.

(t)he number of

••• The government's

of computerized

constrained

article

has dwindled to 11 and three are

in bankruptcy

development

newspaper

and 14 start-ups of significant

in operation

not enforcing

antitrust

Within six years they were joined by

The result was 40 carriers

operating

INDUSTRY

words:

three intrastate

airlines

about inadequate

out in a recent

"When airline deregulation
domestic

AIRLINE

of landing rights at capacityIf the federal government

continues

to abandon its responsibility

antitrust

laws, eventually

to enforce

the flying public may be left

with just three mega carriers

- American,

Delta and

United"u7

U7 Perspective
On Air Travel; Deregulation: An Idea
Gone Wrong - The New Fares Will Create Hardships For Many
Passengers And Make It Hard For All But A Few Huge

93
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This popular perception
antitrust

enforcement

The proponents
existing

had assumed that the

laws and enforcement

take care of any antitrust

arise after deregulation.u9
deregulation

deregulation

machinery

would

issues which might

The actual experience

after

has been contrary to these expectations.

The tendency
contractual

need for

is shared by many academicians.2~

of deregulation

antitrust

adequately

of the desperate

towards mergers,

integration

consolidations

and

has been very strong in the

era. In addition,

several airlines have

exited the market via bankruptcy.

As a result the industry

has become highly concentrated.
The antitrust
been voiced
antitrust

in various

of this concentration

forums. Other major concerns

arena have been about the frequent

apparently
reservation
airlines

implications

predatory
systems,

possessing

facilities

practices,

has
in the

instances

of

the misuse of computerized

and the problems

created by the major

most of the nations scarce airport

like airport slots and gates.

carriers To Compete,
ed.) Part B, p 7.

Los Angeles Time, Apr 23, 1992 (Metro

248

See e.g., Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulatory
Schizophrenia, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1059 (1987); Barry E. Hawk,
Airline Derequlation After 10 Years - The Need For
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement and Intergovernmental
Aqreements, 34 ANTITRUST BUL. 267, (1989); Louis B.
Schwartz, Some Additional Safeguards for the Newly
Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1049 (1987).
249

See supra note 200 an d' accompanYlng

t ex.
t
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The antitrust

enforcement

failed to adequately
will discuss

machinery,

however,

address these concerns.

these problems

has

This chapter

and attempt to analyze this

failure.

5.1

Consolidations.
Antitrust

law does not prohibit

or acquisition

which increases

What is pertinent
or acquisition.
substantially

Mergers And Acquisitions
every kind of merger

industry concentration.

is the competitive

impact of the merger

It is only when the transaction
reduces

to create a monopoly

competition

in the market

that it is proscribed

or tends

by the

anti trust laws. 250
The assessment
however,

of the competitive

is complex.

A court doing traditional

has to first define the relevant
shares of the merging
merger,

companies

and draw inferences

parties

and the competitive

to the merger.

procompetitive

before and after the

section

the likelihood

effects,

the procompetitive
effects.

7, Clayton Act.

the

of potential

style and history

and anticompetitive

offset the anticompetitive

250

to competition,

Since a transaction

to further decide whether

the

from these facts as well as

of other competitors,

competition

analysis

market, measure

from other factors such as barriers
strength

impact of a merger,

of the

may have both
the court has
effects

96

In the case of the airline
drive towards mergers

industry the compelling

and vertical

network

be partly

attributed

discussed

in the last chapter. As observed

reputation

to the economies

are crucial

for survival

integration

can

of scale and scope
there,

size and

in the airline

industry.

If two new entrant airlines

merged,

resulting

airline would undoubtedly

economies

of scope which the larger route network would

benefit

the

from the

provide.

But it would still have to reckon with the

superior

technological

major

and informational

carrier with an established
An easier method

be by merging
mergers

to obtain the same advantages

with a established

by such considerations.

these efficiency
intention

justifications

carrier.

were probably
in several

masked

because

cases

the real
- to get

competitor.~2

When determining

of inquiry

However,
probably

would

Many of the

of the larger of the merger partners

rid of a bothersome

of a

brand. 251

in the earlier days of deregulation

prompted

allowed

advantages

whether

the transaction

of its procompetitive

is whether

should be

effects

the same efficiencies

a valid line

could be

251This would include such factors as the major
carrier's goodwill and brand name, CRS, existing frequent
flyer programs, possession of scarce airport facilities,
and an operating hub and spoke system.
252Kahn, supra note 248, at 1064 ("It is not merely probably not even primarily - the ability to offer better
services that motivates the linkage of route systems;
rather it is the ability to control traffic.")
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obtained
brought

in some other manner.

about by such consolidations

been attained

through

cooperative

a common brand name. However,
exploit

Some of the efficiencies

economies

could probably

marketing

ventures

such joint ventures

of scope suffered

have
using

to

from some serious

disadvantages.
To begin with, they raised problems
services

offered under it to counteract

principal-agent,

of monitoring

the

interfirm

free riding, and other problems

created

by opportunistic behavior of the parties to the joint
253
venture.
Moreover, the effects of such interdependence
was likely to be long lasting, making the need for joint
. 11y, suc h )01n
.. t
e ff or t more or 1ess permanen.t 254F1na
ventures

would have been indistinguishable

division

of markets

under the antitrust
antitrust

and could have resulted

in prosecution

laws.~5 So, ironically,

the

laws themselves

may have been partly responsible

for the spate of airline mergers
Whether

today because
such mergers

observed

a court would have considered

anticompetitive

from horizontal

in balance,
the agencies

however,

in the eighties.
such mergers

has become academic

responsible

for scrutinizing

for most of the last decade simply approved

them.

253Levine(1987),
254
Id.
255
Id.

supra note 14, at 431.

as
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The residual
acquisitions,
transferred

authority

originally

vested

to the Department

airline

Antitrust

of antitrust

Division

intervening

in the CAB, was

of Transportation

scrutiny

of the Justice

years between

Deregulation

(DOT) by
This

devolved

on the

Department.

During

the passage

Act and the assumption

the Justice

Department,

for mergers

and consolidations

practically

of this function

were approved

approval

in spite of opposition

Department
Using

•

of Justlce.

performance

by the CAB

(DOT). 257 At times,
by the

258

a "functional"

focused

by

all of the proposals

of Transportation

was given

the

of the Airline

and the Department

256

and

ended on Jan I, 1989, from which date the

responsibility

which

mergers

Board Sunset Act of 1984256•

the Civil Aeronautics
authority

to review

approach

to merger

"on factors that affect

(and) not on concentration

analysis

competitive
statistics,"

See supra note 159 and accompanying

the

text.

257

Hawk,

See Levine(1987) supra note 14, at 409, & n 77.;
supra note 248, at 280-82.

258
Id. For example, the DOT unconditionally
approved
Northwest's acquisition of Republic, TWA's acquisition of
Ozark, and United's acquisition of Pan Am's Pacific
Division.; See also Donald T. Bliss & Jacob M. Lewis,
Overseeinq Competition in the Airline Industrv: Will the
Transfer to Justice Department Make a Difference ? 34 FED
B. NEWS J. 293, n. 13 (Sept, 1987) referring to D.O.T.
orders - NWA-Republic Acquisition Case, Order No 86-7-81
at 1 (July 31, 1986); TWA-Ozark Acquisition Case, Order
No. 86-9-29 at 2, (Sept 12, 1986); Pacific Division
Transfer Case, Order No 85-11-67, at 16-17 (Oct 31, 1985).
See also Kahn, supra note 248, at 1062-63.

99

DOT concluded

that none of the mergers

were anticompetitive
market

power.

as the participants

did not have

259

As a result of these approvals
rose significantly,

260

bringing

about the DOT's permissive
and opponents

or acquisitions

concentration

forth strong criticism

attitude

of deregulation.261

industry

from both proponents

This perception

of

259 Bliss
& Lewis, supra note 258. Apparently
the
analysis was based on two rather questionable assumptions.
The first was about lack of market power, a result of
characterizing the airline industry as perfectly
contestable. The second was that mergers inevitably
increase efficiencies. The DOT's analysis thus boiled down
to two unsupported propositions: 1) that potential
competition was a sufficient safeguard against antitrust
violations; and 2) that all mergers were presumptively
procompetitive.
200 The exact
estimates vary but there is a broad
agreement that concentration has increased significantly.
See Hawk, su~ra note 248, at 275-280; FEDE~ T~E
COMMISSION, THE DEREGULATED AIRLINE INDUSTRY: A REVIEW OF THE
EvIDENCE, 18 (1988) In 1978, there were 36 certified
carriers and the four largest carriers accounted for 57.4%
of total revenue passenger miles, while the eight largest
airlines accounted for 80.9%. By 1987, the number of
carriers had fallen to 25, and the four largest carriers
accounted for 66.4% of total passenger revenue miles,
while the eight largest carriers accounted for 90.3%.
Since then several other airlines have gone bankrupt and
left the market so the industry is even more concentrated
today.
261 See. e.a.
Testimony of C.F. Hitchcock, Aviation
Consumer Action Project, Proceedings before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate
Judiciary Comm. (March 25, 1987) at 8 ("merger proposals
that would have been laughed out of the room a few years
ago will sail through today."); Testimony of A.E. Kahn,
former Chairman of CAB, Proceedings before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate
Judiciary Comm. (March 25, 1987) at 2 (criticizing
D.O.T.'s "inadequate appreciation of the importance of
aggressive antitrust policy in keeping the airline

100
inadequate

federal

state governments
participation
merger

antitrust

as evidenced

services

concentration

263

function

Generals

in aviation

about the impact of the

in the industry

on the air

review authority

by the Antitrust

to the Justice
assumption

Division,

to this situation.

the other antitrust
deregulation

calls for expedited

as well as the subsequent

little difference

machinery

concern

and resultant

of antitrust

Department,
this

by the

in their states.2~

The criticism
transfer

was echoed

by the frequent

of their state Attorney

cases to express

increasing

enforcement

however,

has been equally

has made

The experience

issues that have arisen

shows that the antitrust

of

with

after

enforcement

inept at handling

them. Three

industry competitive and so continuing the promise of
deregulation. ") See also Kahn, supra note 248, at 1062.
Though Kahn still felt at that time that airline markets
were sufficiently contestable he emphasized on the need to
preserve competition through the antitrust laws. ("In my
opinion, the contestability of airline markets does not
afford sufficient protection ... a competitor in the
market is worth six potential contestors in the bush.")
262

See e.g. Comments of the Attorney Generals of New
York and West Virginia, USAir-Piedmont Acquisition Case,
Docket No 44719 at 3 (March 28, 1987) (pointing out that
the "share of the largest five airlines measured by
revenue passenger miles skyrocketed from 54.7% in January
1986 to 71.8% in 1987").
263

See, e.g., 133 CONGo REC. S3619-20 (Daily Ed.
March 20, 1987) (remarks of Senator Metzenbaum
(D-Ohio) on
the introduction of a bill to accelerate the transfer to
fall, 1987 instead of Jan, 1989 as contemplated by the
Sunset Act.

101
of these issues are briefly examined to illustrate

this

ineffectiveness.

5.2

ComDuterized

Reservation

The immense complexity
generated

by the airline

made electronic
Computerized

Systems

and volume of information

industry after deregulation

data processing

Reservation

indispensable.

Systems

(CRS)264,

some of the major airlines has automated
ticket writing

functions

different
developing

flights.

The

developed

by

the booking and

of travel agents and enabled them

to keep track of the constantly
and the availability

has

changing

of different

routes,

flights

kinds of tickets on

Due to the exorbitant

cost of

a CRS only five airlines had been able to

.
thOe1r own CRS sys t ems. 265 Th e rema1n1ng
...
acqu1re

a1r I'1nes

264 American
Airlines and united Airlines separately
marketed the first commercial CRS's in the late 1970's.
See P. EHLERS, COMPUTERIZEDRESERVATION SYSTEMS IN THE AIR
TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 4 (1988); Note, The Leqal and Requlatory
Implications of Airline Computer Reservation Systems 103
HARVARD LAw REVIEW 1930 (1990).
265

American (SABRE), United (APOLLO), Eastern
(SYSTEMONE), TWA and Northwestern(jointly)
(PARS), and
Delta (DATAS II) Of these SABRE and APOLLO together have
more than 75% of the CRS market, while the remaining three
shared the balance 25%. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
STUDY OF AIRLINE COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS, 159-169.
Systemone is currently owned by a partnership between
Texas Air Corp subsidiary and a General Motor subsidiary.
See Note, supra note 264 at n. 10. Through a merger
blessed by the Antitrust Division Delta, Northwest and TWA
merged their CRS's to form Worldspan in February 1990.
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have had to use these CRS by paying fees to these
airlines.

5.2(i)

Competitive

The ownership
several advantages.
translated

Advantaqe

bv CRS Ownership

of a CRS gives the major airlines
While a large part of this gets

into more efficient

technological

Conferred

and strategic

operations,

advantages

the

the CRS's offer

poses a major impediment

to competition.

also enable the airlines

to indulge in certain kinds of

activity

In addition,

they

which affect their non-CRS owning rival's ability

to compete effectively.

5.2(i) (a) Enhanced Manaqement

And Market Monitorinq

Capabilities
The extremely
the major airlines
owner airlines
1)

sophisticated
a distinct

by allowing

to improve management

advantage

has given

over the non-CRS-

it
techniques

manage the complicated,
seats on different

CRS technology

by enabling

layered200 inventories

it to
of

flights in a much more efficient

manner than their non-CRS owning rivals;
2)

to monitor more effectively
loyalty they compete,

the agents for whose

i.e., frequent

flyers and

200 The practice
of charging different types of
customers different prices for the same journey on the
same flight.

11

travel agents, and use that information
markets more efficiently
would present

3)

customers

by designing

to ensure loyalty;

to obtain market

intelligence

owning airlines

flights.267

and processing

and enhancec

capability,

agents to divert customers

greater

to their

schemes or discount

traffic or revenue.

fares in

of bookings are

made, as is usually the case with the dominant
a hub, it gets the additional

business

picture

patterns.

to the information
travel patterns
effectively
agents

2~

incentive

advantage

In contrast,
generated

of obtaining

a

an airline without acces

by the CRS knows only the

its frequent

schemes.

Levine(1987)

airline ir

of both its own and its rival's

of its own customers.

monitor

the

If the airline

the system on which the majority

very accurate

CRf

of their efforts to

They are also better able to monitor

attracting

the

are able to keep tabs on their travel

success of new incentive

controls

device bettel

intelligence

agents and check the effectiveness
induce travels

about the users of th.

strategies.

As a result of this market
monitoring

scale an<

and

its rivals and, thereby,

and faster competitive

information

awards that

with the requisite

scope incentives

CRS including

to segment

It has no way to

flyer programs

or travel

It is also unable to get a

supra note 14, at 460-61.
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complete

picture

initiative,

of the success or failure of a marketing

advertising

Due to this advantage,
operate more efficiently,
intelligence
signals

or service change.2M

campaign

the CRS owner can not only

but it can also use the market

gained from the system to distort market

to its rivals and lead them to make wrong

inferences

from the market~9. If the CRS owner finds

that a rival's
counteract
programs,
rival's

strategy

is becoming

that through targeted
or by selective

successful,

it can

secret incentive

measures

aimed at nullifying

gains. Not only does this enhance the owner

airlines'

ability to respond rapidly and selectively

therefore

cheaply),

wrong

the

impression

(and

it also can give the rival airline the

about the appropriateness

of its

strategy.

S.2(i) (b) Abilitv

Raise Rivals Costs Or Bias The

Distribution

Channel

The CRS's also provided
opportunity

their airline

to exploit their technological

impair their competitors

competitiveness.

capabilities

computer

was to bias the primary display
terminals

by a DOT rule

screens of the

so that the flights of the CRS owner

2~

Id., at 461-62.

269

Id., at 462.

to

One practice,

which was fairly common till it was outlawed
making,

owners the

105
would

get a preferential

using

it. Another

treatment

practice

from the travel

agents

was to charge the non owner

airline

excessively

high rates for using the system.

Several

regulations

have also been made to address

types

of problems.

270

Allegations

of bias are still leveled
in Congress

for dealing

5.2(i) (c) Ability
Finally,

272

airlines

with them271•

to Earn Incremental

from booking

This "incremental
in a superior

as significant

barrier

and the

the CRS owner still

fees and user

revenue"

competitive

Income

are not biased

are not exclusionary,

earns a hefty revenue

forms

and a bill has been introduced

even if the terminals

CRS user charges

charges.

about more subtle

these

places

position

the maj or
and also acts

to contestability.

•
d Compu t er Reserva t 10n
.
Carr1er-Owne
Sys t ems, 49
Fed. Reg. 32,540, 32,562-4 (1984). For a description of
some of these abusive practices, see Republic Airlines,
Inc. v. United Airlines Inc., 796 F.2d 526 (DC Cir. 1986);
United Airlines v. civil Aeronautic Board, 766 F.2d 1107,
1115 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding regulations)
270

271 See Air Competition
Bill Reaches Key Juncture,
States News Service (On Line Lexis) June 30, 1992,
(referring to H.R. 5466, Airline Competition Enhancement
Act, 1992 )
272

million

. l'
~ dAm' er1can A 1r
1nes earne d more th an $ 1 0 0
from its CRS, SABRE, in 1991.
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Antitrust

5.2(ii)

Challenges

Limitations

against CRS Owners

of Conventional

Antitrust

The lack of equal access to technology
incremental

strength of their non-owner

have labeled these practices
number of challenges

inhibits

rivals who

unfair and anticompetitive.

A

against CRS owners have been brought

by the non-CRS-owning
monopolization

Laws

and the

income earned from the CRS seriously

the competitive

:

airlines,

including

claims of
and attempted monopolization273 under

Section 2 of the Sherman Act. CRS litigants have also
claimed that CRS"s are essential

facilities

CRS owners have been denied reasonable

to which non

access.

Although
explained

the Supreme Court has never precisely
the "essential facilities" doctrine274, courts

have relied on it to require a monopolist
competitors
essential
declare

reasonable

to provide

its

access to a facility deemed

for continued

competition.2~

a facility essential

A court may

if competitors

cannot

m See. e.g., In re Alr
. Passenger Compu t er
Reservations System Antitrust Litigation, 694 F. Supp.
1443 (C. D. Cal. 1988); In re "Apollo" Air Passenger
Computer Reservation System (CRS), 720 F. Supp. 1068, 1075
(S.D.N. Y 1989).
274See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw P 736. la,
at 699-701

..
e.q., Aspen Sk'llng
Co. v. Aspen Hlg hI an d s
Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); otter Tail Power Co. v.
States, 410 U.S 366 (1973); Associated Press v.
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Hecht v. Pro-Football,
570 F. 2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977)

275

Skiing
united
united
Inc.,

(Supp. 1989).

See.

107
reasonably
handicap

duplicate

it without

experiencing

and if rivals cannot meaningfully

access to it.276 An essential

facility

a severe
compete without

claim need not

show that the plaintiff

has been totally

excluded

from

access to the facility;

it may also allege that the terms

on which access has been given access are highly
unreasonable.

277

The CRS owners have never denied non-owners
of CRS facility
complaints
practices
charges

for booking tickets

have been about allegedly

and, therefore,

contracts

the

exclusionary

like biasing of screens, unreasonably
and discriminatory

the use

high user

with travel agents.

Most of these have been taken care of by regulations
f rame d·

1n recen t years.

278

276

See e.q., Hecht, 570 F. 2d at 992; Tye,
Competitive Access: A Comparative Industrv Approach to the
Essential Facilitv Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L. J. 337, 346
(1987); Note, Rethinkinq the Monopolist's Duty To Deal: A
Leqal and Economic Critique of the Doctrine of "Essential
Facilities" 74 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (1988).
277 See e.q.,
Consolidated
F. Supp. 1493, 1534 (S.D. Fla.
essential facility claim where
unreasonable).,
aff'd 880 F.2d
889 F.2d 264 (11th Cir. 1989).

Gas Co. v. City Gas Co. 665
1987) (upholding an
the defendant's terms were
297, reh'g en banc granted,

278 See e.g., Carrier-Owned
Computer Reservation
Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 32,540 (1984) (codified at 14 C.F.R.
§ 255 (1988); Computer Reservation
Systems, 54 Fed 38,870
(1989) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 255); Display of Joint
Operations in Carrier-Owned Computer Reservation Systems,
49 Fed. Reg. 9430, 9433 (1984) (codified at 14 C.F.R. §
256); U. S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, 1985 REpORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE TO CONGRESS ON THE AIRLINE COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEM
INDUSTRY (1985); u. S . DEPT OF TRANSPORT, STUDY OF AIRLINE
COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS (1988); U. S. DEPT OF TRANSPORT,
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That still leaves the very real barriers
contestability
capabilities

and market

on its owner.
condition
technology.
through

posed by the superior

Indeed,

intelligence

it effectively

for contestability,

The scope of removing

investment

superiority

that the CRS confers
upsets

in technology

another

these remaining

barriers

laws seems limited.

and rents attained

"unfairly,,279disadvantages
considered

technological

that of equal access to

the use of the antitrust

Technical

to

development,

through

even if it

a firm's competitors,

the proper target of the antitrust

are not

laws.28o

Even if a court holds that the CRS is an essential
facility,
reasonable
necessary

the CRS owner can be required
access to other airlines
to book tickets

through

to provide

only to the extent

it. The CRS owner would

AIRLINE MARKETING PRACTICES: TRAVEL AGENCIES, FREQUENT-FLYER
PROGRAMS, AND COMPUTER RESERVATION SYSTEMS (1990).
2m Merely
because a competitor would find it
unprofitable to invest heavily on developing a new CRS
does not give him a right ask one who has made such an
investment to forego all its benefits and play on a "level
playing field". Indeed the charge of unfairness could also
be leveled by the CRS owner who has invested such a
substantial amount in developing the system if it is not
allowed to benefit by the superior efficiencies it
permits.
280

See e.q., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) cert. denied 444 U.S. 1093
(1980) ("a large firm does not violat § 2 simply by
reaping the competitive rewards attributable to its
efficient size nor does an integrated business offend the
Sherman Act whenever one of its departments benefits from
association with a division possessing monopoly in its own
market" )
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not be obliged to give its competitor
other facilities
programs)

(like market intelligence

the CRS offers.

The situation
the challenge
monopolization
demonstrate

a plaintiff

,,282

business

especially

acumen, or

if a hub on which the

is chosen as the relevant market.

accident would be extremely

These difficulties

probably

interest

But

that the market dominance

not a result of a superior product,

regulators

as a

The showing of market power should

of establishing

so much regulatory

of that

from growth or development

not be very difficult,

historic

geographic

and the "wilful acquisition

of a superior product,

CRS owner operates

To prove

in such a case would have to

both market power in the relevant

accident.

the problem

if the basis of

is the offence of monopolization.

power as distinguished

historic

and management

281

is not much different

and product markets

consequence

full access to the

business

was

acumen or

difficult

to solve.

explain why, in spite of

in the CRS problem,

the

have confined their efforts to remove bias and

281 The CRS owners do supply the other airlines with
raw data tapes on a slightly delayed basis. The receiving
airline has duplicate software already in existence to
extract the information from the raw data tapes as the CRS
owner does not supply the software. Aside from the delay
which might inhibit immediate response to competitors
actions, the cost of extracting the information also
impedes contestability. See Levine(1987) su~ra note 14, at
463, n.197.
~2

(1966) .

United State v. Grinnel,

384 U.S. 563, 570-71
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other such exclusionary
operations

practices

of the computerized

relating to the actual

reservation

than trying to deal with the problems
vertical

integration

system, rather

raised by the

of CRS owners and airline owners.

While several persons have suggested

that divesture

is the correct solution to this vexed problem,
considered

such a remedy too extreme.

283

others have

The matter

remains unresolved.

5.3

Control Of Airport
Airline

airport

obsession

Slots And Facilities
with acquiring

and holding

on to

assets like airport slots and gates, and their

reluctance

to part with them even when they are not in

use, might partly be due to a fear on their part that
airport

operators

more difficult
Holding

would impose rules which would make it

to acquire airport assets in the future.

on to these scarce resources

strategy

to preempt

Whatever

be the motive, the principal

controlling
airport

competition

could also be a

or raise rivals costs.
effect of

large amounts of unused or under-utilized

assets is to reduce the possibility

of successful

entry into the market by airlines not owning such assets
and restricting

the growth of airlines with limited number

of airline assets.

283

See e.g Levine(1987) supra note, 14 at 482; Kahn,
supra note 241, at 857, 861 & n.15 (1992).
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Depending
keeps

on the extent of facilities

out of circulation,

ability

of other airlines

its actions

may inhibit

to organize

a new hub, establish

a specialized

geographic

a spoke entry

in the airport

controlling

airport

new entrant's

or customer

to attract

traffic

by forcing

it to adjust

availability

of a gate, the incumbent

the new entrant's

connections

Finally,

by not allowing

utilized

gate, the incumbent

conveniently

or even make
by

can frustrate

a

to its service.

its schedule

to the

may be able to
at a distant

the new entrant
might

the

Moreover,

the incumbent

For example,

disrupt

service,

concerned.

services

efforts

the incumbent

hub.

to use its under-

force it to use a less

located gate or share a gate with some other

airline.
Holding
leverage

on to scarce airport

possibilities

use such opportunities
entrant

rival.

sublease

prices

it may charge

•

a very high

by the airport

authority,

even if the new entrant

can be a subject

that is not a very efficacious

Levlne(1987),

does

284

While this type of conduct

284

It can

are, tie the use of the gates to a

not need that service.

action,

airline.

of unused gate space or if the

for ground handling

antitrust

also creates

to raise the costs of the new

are controlled

as they sometimes
contract

for the incumbent

For instance,

rate for the subleases

resources

of an
remedy.

supra note 14, at 470.
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Aside

from increasing

purpose

of the new entrant:

In addition,

the incumbent

that a particular
and therefore
strategy:
operated

its costs further,

using

to enter the market

for use by using a very simple

it. Finally,

many of the airports

are

authorities

long

term agreements

with the dominant

leases/licenses

may be granted

frequent
further

as the ability

and sustained

authority

the claim because
consider

of the carrier

the incumbent

would

enable

infrastructure
the perineal

airline

shortage

alternatives

or airport

unrealistic

facility

over

rights which

from its use.

solution,

of public

of

court may not

to increase

is also troublesome.

state and local legislation
sound pollution

anyone

"obvious"

available,

the outcome

has any property

it to "exclude"

The apparently

may also arise.

could also affect
minded

matters

may be just a licensee

such a license as an essential

which

to provide

This complicates

concerned

a technical

Airport

on such locally pertinent

service.

The fact that the carrier

who have

airline.

as issues such as state immunity

of the airport

to prove

slot was in fact under-utilized

by local government

considerations

the

quickly.

can make it difficult

airport

available

it defeats

Aside

the
from

funds for such purposes,

on matters

such as aircraft

zoning requirements

in the short run.

make such

113
5.4

Predatory

Conduct

The various

developments

after deregulation
information",
incentive
complex

the frequent

Levine

with hidden

capacity

of the computerized

incumbent

to exclude

airlines

controls,

to indulge

from the market.

in the following

"The essence

of the strategy

is simple.

restricted

to confine

oriented,

price

retain

Add

frequency

new entrants
Make

In short,
schedule
object

is to reduce

information
tries

schedule

one's

in traffic

trial

benefits

capacity,

it will

to

the

own departures.
on your

and to subject

that would

Match

to "sandwich"

with either

of operation

trials

convenience

to the leisure-

and frequent

caused

about the new entrant.

to reduce

a low fare

flight

to

by the fare war.
a price

to fly with the new entrant

period

inhibiting

possible,

are available

leave no traveller
incentive

agents

between

seats

increases

to a prolonged
while

where

departures

sure enough

accommodate

of travel

extra

manner.

or better

of the market.

fares and offer

the loyalties

flyers.

sector

Match,

fares with

its attractiveness

sensitive

business-oriented

lowest

systems

in "strategic

such conduct

the new entrant's

or a

... The

the new entrant

at low load factors
disseminate

favorable

If the new entrant
suffer

the

and the

explains

yet beat,

agent

to design

reservation

or oust competitors

of

and travel

of the airlines

of the hub and route systems

has permitted
conduct"

flyer programs

the ability

fare structures

indispensability

industry

- the impact of the "economics

schemes,

evolution

In the airline

from reduced

and will reach the indivisibility

-

114
"floor""pf

frequency

the new entrant
investment
generates
reentry

by actually

operating

to defend

offset

itself

the incumbent

such conditions,
its new entrant
subsidized
entrant's

as initial
with the

the public

be relied

created

it

be lost and

familiarity

cannot

on to keep

by the new comer's

from these

predatory

of temporarily

tactics

-

ceasing

will not operate

especially
competitor.

advantages

not subject

under

costs than

Its losses will however,

price competition,

principal-agent

profitably

if it has higher

by the hub traffic

long as there

largely

may persist,

the benefits

its

285

operat~ons."

be

to the new

and its information

and

will tend to keep passengers

as

is price parity.:2~ll;

The complex

number

some residual

If

the information

will

as expensive

- a disadvantage

•

controls

operating,

that the airline

presence.

in the market,

including

name and service

perception

attempt

While

to maintain

service

will be almost

airlines

No doubt,

ceases

in information,

penetration.

could

required

fare structures

of a CRS owning

of seats allocated

and computerized

incumbent

airline

to different

capacity

to vary the

fares on a flight

by flight

basis.

Due to this, the incumbent

advertise

fares that meet or beat those of the competition

with minor

changes

the number

of lowest priced

285

286

to its basic fare structure.

Id., at 476-477.
Id.

can always

seats offered

By keeping

flexible,

the

115
incumbent

can inundate

and withdraw
when

them almost

competitive

losing

imperceptibly

conditions

low priced

seats

at peak hours or

allow it to do so without

customers.

Such strategic
advantage

potential

also has the additional

a reputation

for fierce

behavior

among the airlines'

competitors.

This reputation

aggressive

fighter

but extends

deterrent

conduct

of generating

competitive

route

the market with

is not confined
to the entire

for future challengers.

Although
individual
multiproduct

to the new entrant
and acts as a

287

is expensive

the fact that the airline

firm which operates
prices

or

of being an

industry

this type of conduct

route,

actual

in several

in different

market

on any

is a
markets

charges

different

permits

it to spread out its costs over its total

and

segments,

.
288
opera t lons.

••
For a dlScusslon
on t he stra t'eglc an d
informational aspects of predation see Williamson ,
Williamson on Predatory Pricing II 88 YALE L. J. 1183,
1184-86 (1979); See also Joskow & Klevonic, A Framework
for Analyzing Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L. J. 213, 231-32
(1979); Schmalensee, Advertising and Entry Deterrence: An
Exploratory Model, 91 J. POL. ECON. 636 (1983).
287

288 See qenerally,
Mark Sievers & Brooks Alberry,
Strategic Allocation of Overhead: The Application of
Traditional Predation Tests to Multiproduct Firms, 60
ANTITRUST
L. J.,
757 (1992).
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Intuitively,
suggests

predatory

the existing

of section

conduct.

claims

elements

gain monopoly

are normally

Attempted

dealing

with it under

asserted

289

monopolization

: 1) specific

power;

as a violation

to gain monopoly

success,

i.e., a dangerous

is left unchecked

In addition
market

power;

it would

requires

attempts
proof of

intent of the defendant

2) improper

directed

relevant

However

immediately

2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits

to monopolize.

market.

behavior

state of the law is no simple matter.

Predation

three

such strategic

conduct

by the defendant

and 3) likelihood

probability

to

of

that if the conduct

lead to a monopoly

some courts also require

so as to assess the danger

of the
proof of a

of actual

. t .
290
monopo 1lza lon.
While the requirement

of intent has been dispensed

with by some courts~1 and is not likely to be any more

Swift & Company
(1905).
~9

396

v. united

states,

196 U.S. 375,

.. v. Tl dewa t er 01
. 1 Co., 327 F. 2d
Bu t see Lesslg
459, 474 (9th Cir 1964), rehearinq denied, 327 F 2d 478,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964) (holding that it is
unnecessary to prove the relevant market in an attempt to
monopolize case.)
290

..
d on how relevant a showlng
.
T h e courts are dlVlde
of intent is to predation claims. The First, Seventh and
Eighth Circuits have held that intent is irrelevant. See
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnel Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232
(1st Cir. 1983); AA poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre
Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402-03 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 110 S. ct. 1326 (1990); Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d
1355, 1359 (8th Cir. 1989). The Third, sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits, however, have held that intent is
relevant. See Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
291
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difficult

to prove than in cases of predation

industries,
conduct,
market

the requirements

dangerous

probability

is especially

sort of strategic

of establishing
of success

troublesome

conduct

in other
predatory

and relevant

in the context

observed

of the

in the airline

industry.
The conduct
competition
business

element

or activities

purpose"

eliminates

alter the demand

function

industry

it is extremely

legitimate

"makes sense only because

of the product,

,,292

reduce

it

the quality

its costs or

that all competitors

In the case of fare wars

airline

of unfair

and does not enhance

confront.

to "eliminate

evidence

which are "without

or which

competition"

or attractiveness

incumbent

requires

difficult

is engaging

competition"

in the airline

to determine

in the pricing

or genuinely

whether

behavior

an

only

to meet the

competition.
The discriminatory
capacity

controls

practices

price structure

can be explained

as they are primarily

seats on the aircraft

and the flexible

as legitimate

designed

as is possible.

business

to sell as many

An airline's

752 F.2d 891 (3d Cir), cert denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985);
Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d
1050 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036(1984);
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027-28
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982);
McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1504
(11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.ct. 2110 (1989).
W2

Wl'11'
lam Ing l'lS & Sons Co 668 F.2 d 1014, 1030-31.
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products

are similar

commodities
vegetables
price

like agricultural

produce.

price while

when the product's

end up with a total

is "competitive"

which

is "without

business

in identifying

and therefore

legitimate

and Donald Turner

business

prices

with

293

a firm possessing

are higher

should

be presumed.

difficulties

pricing,

power was

the court should
costs.

On the other hand,

cost, they

if they are lower

to be predatory.

in estimating

compare

If the

than or equal to the marginal

be presumed

293

that to

monopoly

its short run marginal

prices

Phillip

the relationship

and costs ... They suggest

in predatory

and one

have argued that predatory

between

whether

a low price

purpose",

should be judged by considering

they should

justification

legitimate,

pricing

its prices

stock. An

policy.

which

engaging

to an

price so that he does not

loss on his remaining

Due to the difficulty

determine

at a discounted

shelf life is coming

could also offer a similar

for its pricing

Areeda

of fresh

it is still fresh;

end, he may sell it at a cheaper

airline

A producer

the crop is ready; he may then sell the same

at a higher

finally,

to perishable

may sell part of his produce

before

product

in some respects

Due to practical

the short run marginal

costs

See Areeda & Turner, Predatory pricing and Related
Practices Under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 697

( 19 7 5) .
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they have suggested

that average

variable

costs may be

used as a proxy.
Though
critiques,~4
basis

the Areeda-Turner

test has its fair share of

it has been generally

for proceeding

in predatory

have explicitly

compared

determine

legallty.

their

The Supreme

.

Court,

recognized

as a valid

cases and some courts

prices with average

costs to

2H5

in Matsushita

Electric

Industrial

Co. v. Zenith Radio corp2Hfiseems to have accepted
analysis

by observing

that a firm engaging

pricing

necessarily

further

and states that a firm would

pricing

only if it had a reasonable

recouping

incurs losses.

its profits

this

in predatory

It then goes even
indulge

in such

expectation
2H7

in the future.'

Arguably,

of
the

294See e. g., Liebler, Whither Predatory pricinq ?
From Areeda-Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1052 (1986); Hay, The Economics of Predatory pricinq, 51
ANTITRUST L. J. 361 (1982) i Brodley & Hay, Predatory
pricing: Competinq Economic Theories and the Evolution of
Leqal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1981).
,

295

See e.q., In re IBM Peripheral
Supp. 965, 989-91 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
296

297

475 U.S.

574

EDP Devices,

481 F.

(1986)

Id., at 588-589. ( lithe success of such (predatory)
schemes is uncertain: the short run loss is definite, but
the long-run gain depends on successfully neutralizing the
competition. Moreover, it is not enough simply to achieve
monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may breed quick entry
by new competitors eager to share in the excess profits.
The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining
monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the
predator's losses and to harvest some additional gain ...
For this reason, there is a consensus among commentators
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result

of this decision

would be to require

to show that not only has the defendant
average

the Areeda-Turner

is very helpful

strategic
Firstly,

filling

pricing
there

"marginal

cost" of the airline.

only one passenger

the

Does it mean the cost of

Once the flight has been

or carries

of "average

solely

a plane

to be computed

load.

by dividing

a flight by the total number

for the airline

into account?

Would

from the passengers

on it ? Or would the average

on the route be the correct

costs of all

figure ? The airline

argue that what is really

is its costs spread over its entire

that predatory pricing schemes
more rarely successfully.")

of

to cover the costs of each

from the fares realized

may also convincingly

it

cost" also has its

or are all flights to be taken

it be necessary

flights

of determining

If it does, then the marginal

Is the average

the cost of operating

travelling

industry.

it costs more or less the same whether

difficulties.

flight

seat?

nothing.

The determination

seats,

of

with the kind of

in the airline

is the difficulty

cost is probably

carries

expectation

test, nor the Matsushita

for dealing

observed

an additional

scheduled

below

its losses in the future.

Neither
test,

priced

cost but it also has a reasonable

recouping

the plaintiff

network

are rarely

relevant

and not just

tried,

and even
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on the individual

routes on which

it faces competition

from the plaintiff.
The second problem
price.
would

with the great diversity
be a formidable

course,

be considered

Even if the average
airlines'

average

conceivably

problem.

of prices
Average

irrespective

the relevant
in vogue that

price could,

price was found to be below the

cost, the airline

has to maintain

of the number

it was compelled

could quite
justification

for it.

its flight schedules

of seats booked,

to sell its tickets

it could claim

at lower than

"average"

costs so as to at least earn some revenue

committed

flight.

Such an argument

test of "legitimate
inquiry

business

about whether

than the one offered

Finally,
might

not even entail pricing
notions

on the simplistic

faces effective
segments.
sufficient
pricing

As discussed
revenue

day the airline

to travel

strategy

did

at a fare

impossible.

described

above

below cost. The traditional

about predatory

assumption

competition

In any case, an

would be quite

using the pricing

legal and economic
based

purpose."

willing

from a

could well pass the

on a particular

not have enough passengers
higher

of

but that would not be too helpful.

offer a procompetitive

Since an airline

that

would be to define

pricing

are

that the dominant

in all markets

above, the airline

firm

and market
can generate

to not incur losses by appropriately

the less price elastic

segments

of its markets.

At
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the same time,
prices

it can match or even beat the new entrants

in the more price sensitive

and force the new entrant
lower cost structure.
Determining
possession

are constantly

changing,

which
case

a plaintiff

market

in numerous

circuit

anticompetitive
plaintiff
alleged
caused

by

would have to cross

intent,

from showing

and services

may well

insist on

additional

hurdle

in a civil antitrust

antitrust

injury.2~ The

case has held that

even if shown, did not relieve
its losses were the result

conduct

of the major airline

the

of the

and not

.
.
d compe t 1
.t lone
.
300
any thlng
ot h er than lncrease

In view of these problems
few cases

markets,

of the market.An

in a recent

predatory

and proving

the defendant

is the need to demonstrate

Ninth

in spite of its

power, would also be problematic.

operate

definition

losses

298

Since airlines

a broader

of the market

to suffer

the relevant

of market

segments

involving

it is not surprising

predatory

pricing

that very

have reached

court.

•
. l' lne
See Slevers
& A 1b ery, supra note 288. An alr
can be charecterized as a multiproduct firm because of its
ability to segment its markets.
298

~9
Antitrust injuries are injuries flowing from the
defendant's anticompetitive acts and are not losses
resulting from the increase in competition in the market.
The plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct
was intended to or actually did have an anticompetitive
effect beyond the plaintiff's own loss of business or the
market's loss of a competitor. Brunswick Corp. V. Pueblo
Bowl-Q-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
300 Pacific
Express Inc. v. united Airlines
1992-1 CCH Trade Cas. Par. 69,770.

Inc.,
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Aside from the difficulty
predatory

pricing,

efficacy

in establishing

a very relevant

of the relief. Antitrust

expensive.
uncertain
utility

a claim of

consideration

is the

suits are notoriously

Before a small airline embarks on the highly
venture of filing suit, it must evaluate

the

of the same. The normal relief granted by a court,

after a long and protracted
injunction

procedure

is the grant of an

against future conduct. The delay might mean

that the airline goes out of business

in the meanwhile.

Moreover,

there is no device to ensure that similar

practices

will not be indulged in spite of the injunction.

Enforcing

the order may mean going back to court and

repeating

the whole process once again. Action by the

Antitrust

Division

relieve

of the Department

a new entrant of the additional

financing

5.5

burden of

a law suit, due to the problems

claims as well as factors discussed
Division

of Justice may

of proving

such

below, the Antitrust

has been unable to do much about such practices.

Reasons

for the ineffectiveness

of the Antitrust

Machinerv
The inability
antitrust

concerns

of the Antitrust

Division

to dispel the

caused by the above developments

pinned down to several reasons.

can be

124

5. (5) (i)

Shortcoming

of existinq tests

The Department's
the antitrust
shortcomings
enforcement
oversight

inability to effectively

issues can be partly attributed

to the

of the present tests to determine
action is necessary.

When the antitrust

enf orcement.

in the matter of antitrust

Unl ike the DOT's "functional

approach

,,301

the Department

of Justice places more emphasis

share analysis

embodied

Unfortunately,
problematic

in its Merger Guidelines.

such an analysis becomes quite

there is the difficulty
Airlines

compete

markets.

Geographically

of defining

or business

and product

they may compete for traffic on

routes, at a national

level, at a regional

hubs, between two cities, and

between two airports.

also compete

for different

On every route airlines may

airline

"products"

like economy

class, morning or evening flights, peak or non

peak time flights, or direct or connecting
matters

flights. To

further, the variety of "products"

change almost daily. Finally, the continued

301

First,

a relevant market.

in several geographical

level, over different

complicate

on market

when applied to the airline industry.

international

to the

the airlines were to be treated as

"any other industry"

potential

whether

of the airline industry was transferred

Justice Department,

finally,

deal with

or existing competitors

existence

in a particular

See su~ra note 259 and accompanying

text.

of

market
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is also uncertain.

In such a situation the natural

tendency

is to consider the broader markets as the

relevant

market and ignore apparent

instances of monopoly

power in the narrower markets.
Second, conventional
existence

tests for ascertaining

of market power are difficult

the

to apply. One of

the major indices of market power employed by enforcement
agencies

and courts is the degree of price discretion

a

firm enjoys in the market. But the ability of all airlines
to indulge in discriminatory
of the computerized
makes

it virtually

meaningful

pricing,

and the development

system of hidden capacity

controls,

impossible to use such a test in any

way.

Third, the incorrect belief that the airline markets
were highly contestable
policy makers

for the most of the eighties,

the Departments
transactions

5.5(ii)

shared by most economists

assessment

scrutinized

and

also affected

of the competitive

effects of

by it.

The Policy of Minimal Enforcement

The "policy of minimal enforcement,,302adopted by
the Reagan Administration
significant

has continued

without

change under the Bush Administration.

As a

result even cases in other industries where

302See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100
Years, 75 CAL. L. REv. 817, 818-821.
(1987).
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anticompetitive

effects were more apparent

and industry practices
merger

were more amenable

and the market
to standard

analysis were left alone by the Department.

number of jUdicial appointments
Presidency

during the Reagan

were from the ranks of Chicago economists.

Their well known preference
rather than on the Antitrust
competition
conserve

A large

for relying on the market
Division

may have also influenced

its limited resources

for protecting
the Department

to

for cases in which it would

be easier to present evidence.

5.5(iii)

Leqacv of the DOT's permissive

Reqime

In spite of the Justice Department's
Department

of Transportation

objections,

had permitted

the

several major

consolidations. The airline industry was already
considerably

consolidated

by the time the Justice

Department

was seized of the matter. The mass scale merger

activities

of the early eighty's was no longer there,

leaving the Department
Similarly,

little scope to take much action.

the number of new entrants declined

dramatically

by the end of the eighties,

to check other types of exclusionary

5.5(iv)

reducing

the need

behavior.

Exit Throuqh Bankruptcv

A serious handicap
the transfer

that the Department

of antitrust

scrutiny authority

faces after
to it is that

127

further consolidations
through the mechanism
antitrust

of bankruptcy

carriers

over which the

interested

dominating

in bankruptcy

court. The only

in the assets of these defunct airlines

of still solvent airlines who are

the u.s. skies.

While the Department
bankruptcy

has

bystander while the less fortunate

have disintegrated

are the handful

proceedings

acquisitions
effect,

have been

laws have no control. The Justice Department

been a helpless

buyers

and concentrations

has been appearing

in these

and trying to see that further

by the airlines has the least anticompetitive

its options are limited. In a bankruptcy

proceeding
creditors

the final consideration
though the bankruptcy

is the interests of the

judge can and does take

into account the views of the Antitrust
situation,

the availability

the bankrupt

airline's

of an alternative

assets with a realistic

becomes very important.
that when disposition

Division.

303

The Bankruptcy

of the debtor's

In that

suitor for
offer

Code provides

assets requires

303 For example
in a recent case before the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York, the
Bankruptcy Court could accommodate the views of the
Antitrust Division that a sale of Eastern Airlines' assets
should be sold to Northwest Airlines, the second highest
bidder, as that would be more competitive because, firstly
there was a second bidder, and secondly Northwest
increased its bid to match that of united Airlines, the
highest bidder. See 60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1486, at 541; Helene D. Jaffe, Developments in Merger
Law and Enforcement in 1990-91, 60 ANTITRUST L. J. 667, 672
(1992) .
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Hart-Scott-Rodino

notification

the required

end on the tenth day after receipt
the court,

after notice

very

fast and satisfy

shall

of the filing unless

and hearing,

This means that the enforcement

period

orders

agency

the Bankruptcy

otherwise.304

also has to act

Court about

its

claim.

5.6

Attempts

to Increase

Competitiveness

in the Airline

Industry
Contrary
Division

to the public

has not been entirely

of the airline

industry.

has successfully
systems

averted

owned by American

sale of Eastern's
united

Airlines,

states,

Philadelphia

304

305

regarding

the merger
Airlines

the acquisitions

airport

§

the ills

In spite of its constraints,

it

of the computer
and Delta Airlines,

by American

routes between

and Eastern's

11 U.S.C,

passive

the Antitrust

gates and slots at National

all Trans World Airlines
united

impression,

Airport

the
to

Airlines

London

sale of its assets

and the
at the

to USAir.~5

363 (b) (2).

Robert D. Willig, Antitrust Lessons from the
Airline Industrv: The DOJ Experience, 60 ANTITRUST L. J.
695, 697 (referring to The Aqenda for Antitrust:
Developments at the Department of Justice, Remarks of
James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, u.s. Department of Justice, 25th Annual New
England Antitrust Conference, Cambridge, Mass. (Oct 25,
1991) •

of
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The Antitrust
investigations

involving

of hub carriers
misuse

has also initiated

the alleged

with respect

restrictive

to airport

306

In addition,

DOT to make

it easier

markets

competition

for foreign

atmosphere

next Administration
competitiveness

industry

negative.

307

However,

unless

concentrated

urging

the

to enter the

intense
due to the
are

steps in or the

to ensuring

in the industry.

the developments

in the deregulated

of deregulating

these gains of deregulation.
implications

306

Id., at 696.

307

Id.

airline

many of its supporters,
the industry

The next chapter will briefly

the policy

alleged

these efforts

Congress

is more committed

has disappointed

the results

carriers

of protectionism,

to be fruitful

Though

has been

so that there could be more
in these markets.

prevailing
unlikely

the Division

practices

expansion,

of CRS's and the effect of excessively

hubs.

u.s.

Division

not all

have been
discuss

some of

It will then broadly

of the deregulation

consider

experience.

CHAPTER

6

ASSESSMENT

AND POLICY

IMPLICATIONS

The above discussion

about the outcome

of

deregulation

shows that several key assumptions

the behavior

of the deregulated

wrong

by actual developments.

on others.

Serious

has been proved
doubt has been cast

At the same time antitrust

bankruptcies
subjects

market

and debt, and airline

of considerable

developments

have often obscured

deregulation.

Before discussing

the deregulation
beneficial

concern.

experience

consequences

This chapter
deregulation

enforcement,

safety,

these

the positive
the policy

results

of

to note these

the industry.
these gains of

and assess the over all impact of

deregulation.

In the light of this assessment,

observations

will be made about the implications

deregulation

experience

6.1

of

implications

it is necessary

of deregulating

airline

have become

However,

will briefly mention

regarding

for future policy

a few
of the

in the U.S.A.

The Gains of Deregulation
Deregulation

improvements

has brought

in certain

about significant

aspects

130

of airline

operations.

For

131
one, airline

efficiency

has gone up and costs have gone

'down.~8 In spite of their complexity,
to be much

lower on an average

been had the pricing
309

They certainly

other developed

countries.

air travel

0f

.
serVlce

than what they would have

system under CAB not been

discontinued.

been 1oss

fares today appear

310

are far below those

Finally,

though

in

there has

t 0 some sma 11er communl.t les
. 311 , an d

no longer offers the comfort

it used to in the

308

See e.g., DAVID SAWYERS, COMPETITION IN THE AIR, WHAT
EUROPE CAN LEARN FROM THE U. S.A. 17-23 (1987); Donald
Pickerel, The Regulation and Derequlation of U.S.
Airlines, in AIRLINE DEREGULATION - INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCES 25-27 (Kenneth Button Ed.) (1991).
~9
Econometric estimates of fare reduction vary but
on the whole they seem to have reduced. See e.q.,
Pickrell, supra note 308, at 29 (estimating that on an
average fares are around 15% lower); Morrisson & Winston,
The Dvnamics of Airline Pricinq and Com?etition, Paper
presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Economics
Association, Atlanta, U.S.A. (December 1989) ( On an
average fares 18% lower during 1977-86 and 13-15% lower
subsequently);
See also, BAILEY supra note 15, at 60-66;
MORRISSON & WINSTON, supra note 15, at 19-36; SAWYERS, su?ra
note 308, at 27; Moore, U.S. Airline Deregulation: Its
Effects on Passenqer Capital and Labor, 29 J. L. & ECON 6,
8-9 (1986).
310

See SAWYERS supra note 213, at 55 (fares of
European airlines for comparable distances and markets are
almost double those of U.S. airlines; with some exceptions
European airlines also offer less discounted fares.);
Recent newspaper reports suggest that this trend has
continued and U.S. domestic fares are much less than those
in Europe. See e.g., Euro?e Apt to see Merqer of its
Airlines, page 3, Column 1, Los Angeles Times, March 15,
1992.
311 See Paul Stephen
Dempsey, The Dark Side of
Deregulation:
Its Impact on Small Communities, 39 ADM L.
R. 445; Stephenson & Beir, The Effects of Airline
Derequlation on Air Service to Small Communities, 20
TRANSP. L. J. 54, 57 (1981) .
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hey days of the CAB, airline

customers

wider

and schedules

choice

been possible

of destinations

312

before deregulation

connections

than would have

Today,

•

the hub and spoke system, virtually
daily

do have a much

thanks

every airport

to every other airport

to
has

in the country

with one, or at most two, stop overs.
The lower fares and vastly
services,
amounts

in turn, has generated

earnings

industry,

regions

surrounding

and increased

though

substantially

conformed

proponents

the deregulated

responsive

routing

regarding

larger

gains of
and

development

of

spokes.
market

to the predictions

of deregulation

efficiency,

economic

of

much

in the travel

new hubs and major

Interestingly,

through

and sustained

and employment

tourism

achieved

network

of air travel with the consequential

increased

airline

expanded

has

of the

improvements

in

lower costs and fares, and consumer
313

and scheduling

,

this in ways not anticipated

the market

has

by them: primarily

the hub and spoke system.

However,
deregulation

the problems
have clouded

which have arisen
these

improvements.

after
views differ

312

See S. WHEATCROFT & G. LIPMAN, AIR TRANSPORT IN A
COMPETITIVE EUROPEAN MARKET 87-89 (1986); Hawk, supra note
248, at 271.
3M Welfare
gains to travelers from fare reductions
and service improvements are estimated at six billion
dollars per year. Service is also better suited to
consumer needs. See MORRISSON & WINSTON, supra note 15 at 2,
24-52, 57-59.
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about the gravity
way of dealing
inadequacies

of these problems

with them. While the limitations

of the present

with these problems
reform

or action

economists

regulatory

is generally

required

recognized,

.
t now 314 . In Vlew
•
are more clrcumspec

bold recommendations

6.2

The Futile

before
0f

their reluctance
about policy

Public Debate

"Derequlation"

to deal

the nature of
The

who were so confident

of the industry

by the market,

and

structure

is still not clear.

and academicians

their understanding

rebuff

as also the "proper"

about

deregulation

th elr
. recen t
to make sweeping

or

is understandable.

about the Relative

Merits

of

and "Rerequlation"

But that has not stopped the issue from being
discussed

in the public media or on political

Unfortunately,
most well
emerging

informed

or objective,

are not always the

and public

policy

only from that is not likely to be the best. Just

as public
prices

such public discussions

platforms.

and media obsession

which

distracted
discussed
frustration

immediately

attention

with the wonderfully

followed

deregulation

from the negative

in the last two chapters,
with the inability

low

had

developments

so also the feeling

of the present

system to

••
.
See Levlne,
Alr l'lne Derequ 1a t'lon: A Perspec t lve,
60 ANTITRUST L. J. 687, 694 (1992) ("there is a set of
relationships here that are simply more complicated than
the ones we thought we understood fifteen years ago.)
314

of
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tackle

the industry's

observers

current

unfortunate

that the imperfections
overlooked

aspect of such discussions

regime

market

stability

are glorified.

enthusiasts

counter
which

this by pointing

in the first place.

would

Had

they

for the

of reregulation

out that it was this free market
condition

Both camps,

that their respective

industry

was not complete.

The proponents

led to the dire financial

assume

the industry's

would have found a solution

bottle-necks.

of

Not to be outdone,

not been left out of the free market,

the market

industry's

and simplicity

have blamed

ills to the fact that deregulation
the airports

is

of the CAB era are normally

and the artificial

the regulated

claim,

has made several

loose sight of the gains of deregulation.

Another

hardline

problems

of the industry

of course,

vehicles

behave perfectly

implicitly

for salvaging

and in accordance

the

with

text book precision.
Public
,

degenerated
demerits

policy

discussions,

into a futile debate

of "deregulation"

"reregulation",
only two options
notoriously
shortcomings

therefore,

in a manner
available.

have

about the merits

and

vis a vis those of
suggesting
315

that these are the

Public memory

short, most people
of the CAB regime.

being

have forgotten

about the

To allay the fears of

315 Par tl y, th'
. a Iso d ue t 0 th e con f'
1S 1S
uS1ng na t ure
of the two expressions.
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those who still remember,
hint at "partial
undefined

reregulation",

mix of free market

or capacity

regulatory
one would

debating

seriously

that perfect

markets

to some

and price,

route

merits

market

is meaningless.

would produce
place.

results

few would

to imperfect

niether

No

that

better

Likewise,

are superior

of a perfect

doubt

regulatory

the market

nor the

is perfect.

A better
questions.

of the Nineties

line of inquiry

is to ask three basic

First, what are the lessons one has learnt

the experience

of the last decade

assessment

competition,

type of regulatory
Second,
the context
airline

referring

the proposition

in practice

The Challenge

airline

dispute

market

However,

objective

on the relative

when perfect,

than an imperfect

regulator

operations

system and a perfect

regulation,

regimes.

thereby

of reregulation

controls.

However,

6.3

the proponents

divorced
structure

or so. This has to be an
of airline

of the airline

markets

from the question

and

of what

is needed.

what do we mean by "the public

industry

Third,

of the nature

from

industry,

interest"

in

i.e., what kind of an

would we like to have.

in view of these

and this understanding

"lessons"

of deregulation,

of the kind of industry

serve the best interests

of the public,

which would

what kind of a
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regulatory

structure

seems more capable

of delivering

the

goods.
Answering
the challenge
academicians
immerse

analyzing

of airline

and simplified

competition

in

But it must be
reality,

have to be taken

has substantially

acknowledged

and spoke systems
organizing

present

to be shed on how these

business

and the reality

it is widely

to the industry's

of the Derequlation

The last decade
perception

to try

into

by policy makers.

The Lessons

of airline

Experience
altered

air transport.

as an inevitable
controls.

both the

competition.

that the economies

The complexity

Today

of the hub

makes them the most efficient

and the importance

regulatory

about

are no doubt helpful

is to help explain

solutions"

of the airline

consideration

accepted

assumptions

of the industry.

some light is intended

system

and

of the airline

it is beyond the scope of this thesis

the "correct

realities

6.4

is

it up.

While
suggest

models

that their purpose

not cover

policy makers

into the the reality

the performance

recognized

manner

have to meet. For that they would have to

Abstract

the nature

in a meaningful

which the regulators,

themselves

business.

woes,

these questions

means

of

of the price

of the CRS is also widely
consequence

Moreover,

of removing

it is no longer disputed
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that the entry barriers

inherent

in the system make entry

by a small new airline virtually

impossible.

has these

about the functioning

and other observations

the industry
of airline
policy

after deregulation

competition

alternatives

What,

then,
of

tought us about the nature

? In order to meaningfully

it is necessary

to answer

consider

this

question.

6.4(1)

Effective

Competition

Comparable

Requires

Competitors

strenqth.

The first lesson from the deregulation
that for effective
of comparable
virtually

competition

all of the airlines

name,

it is necessary

an extensive

viable

is simple,
more

swings

The liquidation

which

entered

of

the industry

shows that for survival

route system,

is

must be

to have a well recognized

hub, and sufficient

and seasonal

experience

the rival airlines

size and strength.

in the wake of deregulation
industry

of

an adequate

in the
brand

presence

at a

funds to tide over price wars

in business.

The implication

of this

if the policy makers want to make the industry

competitive

they must be able to attract

who can enter the industry

competitors

in as large a scale as the

.
b en t s. 316
lncum

316 This
in itself is not a very startling finding.
Conventional wisdom and traditional legal analysis has
always recognized that a "fair" fight requires rivals of
comparable stature and ability.
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6.4(2)

Need to Discouraqe

"Pernicious"

Manaqement

Practices
Second,
Braniff

the fate of former giants

and Eastern

are essential
sufficient.
well thought
strategies,
become

like Pan American,

has shown that while these conditions

for survival,

Established
routes

they apparently

carriers

which

and products,

could not develop

effective

as well as those who allowed

overburdened

with highly

are not

leveraged

marketting

themselves
debts,

to

have also

sunk with the new entrants.317
Does that require
depend

on our ability

failure.

to identify

If the failure

unimaginative
judgement

any policy

is not the function
incompetence.

strategies

no action

intentional

bleeding

take over artists

to

for. After

practices

of healthy

not interested

all it

to nurse and protect

if part of the problem

what we may label "pernicious"

of this

or bad business

is called

of the government

However,

? That would

the causation

is to be attributed

competitive

probably

initiative

companies

seems due to

such as the
by corporate

in running

the airlines

317 For a description
of the different corporate
strategiesof the 10 largest CAB certificated airlines and
an analysis of why only four, American, United, Delta and
Northwest were successful see Byrnes supra note 73. Since
then Northwest has also fallen into serious financial
trouble due to a massive billion dollar leveraged buyout
debt. See And Then There Were? Fare Wars, Law Suits give
Rise to Fears that Industry may become Oligopoly, Star
Tribune, col. 6, p. 10, June 26, 1992.
)

/
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as a business

enterprise,

a policy

response

appears

appropriate.
The question
pernicious
takeover

still remains

activities

whether

will be checked.

bid be submitted

will use its own

within

agency which
to decide

is likely to have an adverse

making

impact

? Should we simply ban

of the corporation

decision

Should every

judgement

such take overs ? Or can we device
individual

as to how these

to a regulatory

(non business)

the takeover

on the health

of course

some method

is preserved

by which

but confined

a broad range of safety based on scientifically

observed

data, not abstract

seem to confine

themselves

theory

? Present discussions

to the first two options.

certainly

is a need to explore

6.4(3)

Atomistic

There

the third possibility.

Competition

Precluded

due to

Indivisibilities
The third
that atomistic

lesson from the deregulation
competition

indivisibilities
or maintain
address

is precluded

in the industry.

the competitive

the question

of indivisibilities
natural

monopolies

support

a second

to increase

level of the industry

in the industry.

must

of hubs and the role
Hubs are close to

as many of the spokes
As a result,

likely to enjoy the comprehensive

is

due to the

Any attempt

of the viability

carrier.

experience

are too thin too

only one airline

traffic

feed necessary

is
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for competitive
than one carrier

survival.

318

Artificially

keeping

in such hubs is unlikely

more

to be beneficial

for any of them or for their customers.

6.4(4)

Effective

Competition

in a Hub

Does that mean that there is no scope for competition
in such hubs? The answer to this question
determine
19

the nature

stud/

of non-stop

network

effects

of regulation

required.

city pair routes

are unimportant

is crucial

traffic,

carriers

competitors
network

competing

airlines

constrained
traffic.

entering

by their ability

In practical

competition
offered

are important

route,

on feed

act as effective

and thus discipline

effects

that if

on a particular

do not have to depend

all existing

An empirical

suggests

i.e., if the carriers

to

prices.

If, however,

on a route,

that city-pair
to capture

the scope of
market

sufficient

is
feed

terms this means that effective

in a hub dominated

by one airline

can be

only by an airline which uses that hub as a spoke

for its own hub.

318

See supra note 142 and accompanying text;
Kahn(1992), supra note 241, at 863; Levine(1987),
note 14, at 444-445.

supra

319 Hurdle,
Johnson, Joskow, Werden & Williams,
Concentration,
Potential Entry, and Performance in the
Airline Industrv, 38 J. INDUS. EeoN. 38 (1989).
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Since the total number of possible
a country's
number
support

size and population,

of airlines

two fold. First,
enable

airlines

each others

secondary,

having

number

remain

pressure

of airlines

on the landscape
on the market

but important,

number

of market

when

of the market
volatile,
to operate

6.4(6)

market

facilities

is real only
incumbents

foreign

airlines

Access

unless

of strength

the problem

is solved. Relying

The problem

look at the

routes.

or on the local authorities

is unrealistic.

is

the

but politically

to woo competitors

not likely to be successful
to airport

measure

between

one must

For competition

domestic

of Airport

efforts

A

participants.

may be to permit major

Problem

hub and

to put sufficient

as a threat by the actual

on selected

However,

with viable

is no collusion

place. A promising,

method

in

it has to be ensured

aspect of this policy

like a participant.

it is perceived

and

spokes

participants.

To come out with a viable policy
problem

will

of this are

hubs to operate

Second,

by

that the

of any country

implications

different

the need to ensure that there
limited

is limited

a device has to be found to encourage

that a sufficient

competitive

The policy

hubs and spokes.

spoke systems

it follows

that the traffic

is limited.

hubs

are

of access

on the free

to solve this problem

can be tackled

only at the
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federal

level. That does not mean that the federal

government

will have to administratively

allot these facilities.
devised

in which all airlines

resources.
airline

However

based system

incentive

more than a maximum

The period

any measure,

structure

for which these

its likely

of the airlines

likely repurcussions

on consumers

The move may also meet political
airlines

has difficulties

number

of

facilities

Of course

before

impact on the
as well as on the

has to be considered.
hurdles

are bound to lobby against

this alternative

can be

can bid for the scarce

be leased could also be limited.

recommending

whom to

a cap may be fixed to limit any single

from controlling

slots or gates.
would

A market

determine

as the major

it. But merely

does not mean

because

it should

not be considered.

6.4(7)

Requlatinq

Finally,
Industry

while the indispensability

to the airline

effective

solution

potential

of misuse

The most
wonders

the CRS Industry

important

is required

competitors'

is undeniable,

to minimize

of the CRS technology
drawbacks

in the present

their airline

industry

an

or remove the
by their owners.

of these technological

industry

set up is that they enable

owners to get real-time
business

of the CRS

patterns.

information

on their
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There can be several ways of dealing

with this

problem.
(a)

Divesture
First,

the link between

can be severed.
possibility

Divesture,

the CRS and the airline

however

would not remove

of the new CRS owner selling

and information

the

the same program

bidder,

especially

if the

new CRS owner can enter into exclusive

agreements

with the

purchaser.

Divesture,

safeguard
general

to the highest

owner

against

antitrust

anticompetitive
preferable,
antitrust

therefore

must be coupled

such exclusive

dealings.

While the

laws may well be employed

dealings

to curb such

by the new owner,

in view of the "selective"
laws by the concerned

in the past, to specifically

it would

enforcement

admininistrative

prohibit

with a

be
of the

agencies

such anticompetitive

dealings.
(b)

Merqer

of all CRS to form a Public utility

A second
different

alternative

CRS's to form one universal

and regulating

the CRS industry

That way all airlines
informational
That would
economies
enjoys.

could be to merge all of the

like a public

could get equal access

advantages

also permit

reservation

system

utility.
to the

of the CRS on the same terms.

realization

of the considerable

of scale and scope which the CRS industry
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The implications
possessing
examined

perfect

market

very carefully.

whether

there

airlines

or requiring

objection

perceived

"unfairness"

The

on account

of this method

Surely,

of the

of competition

competitors

due

from access

it may be argued,

if all

have equal access to such real time knowledge

The danger,
knowledge"

in the situation.

however,

in such a situation

is the possibility

and capacity

sharing.

Although

under the antitrust

collusion

of "perfect

of the airlines

route and price strategies

be illegal
proving

business

of any inherent

of the non-owner

is no inequity

collusive

the

owner of a CRS using such

to the same information.
competitors

needs to

in keeping

intelligence.

of the same but rather

to the exclusion

fixing

however,

benefit

such market

is not on account

undesirability

industry

them to rely on less efficient

to an airline

information

airline

One may ask, in this context,

is any significant

of of getting

there

intelligence,

in the dark about their rivals'

activities
means

of an oligopolistic

through

indulging
tacit price

such activity

laws, the problem

in these circumstances

in

would

of

would probably

be

impossible.
(c)

Mandatory

Disclosure

A third option which
certain

disclosures

example

a travel

by Travel Aqents
is worth considering

mandatory

for the travel

is to make
agent.

agent may be asked to disclose

For

to the

145

customer

which airline

CRS is being used. The customer

then search

out a travel

agent who operates

and compare

the services

offered

disclosure
scheme

requirements

for divesture

in conjunction

6.5

by them. Such mandatory

need not be an alternative

of the CRS Industry

translating

deregulation

experience

is important

to define with reasonable

achieve

the policy

aim of any policy

interest"

policy

prescription
interest.

in the context

of the

proposals

clarity

to achieve.

is in the public

by the "public

but may be used

implications

into specific

should be desiged

what

to a

Interest"

Before

ultimate

CRS

with it.

The "Public

proposals

another

can

it

what the

No doubt the
should

be to

But what

is meant

of the airline

industry?
This a particularly
which

important

is often side-tracked

the case of airline
bankruptcy

in academic

bankruptcies.

of an airline

and vexed question
discussions.

Why should

be of any special

Take

the

significance?

How or why does it attract more concern

than the

liquidation

? Is it because

signifies

of another

concern

the end of an era of extremely

(Peoples Express),
of history

business

or because

(Pan American),

even the largest

it means the end of a part

or because

of airlines

low fares

it displays

cannot withstand

the

that

it
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combination

of poor management

Or consider

the issue of "discriminatory

the complexity

deregulation

also enabled

she is getting

many persons,

to afford

tickets.

of the price structure

has made it impossible

find out whether

unable

Would

better merely

fare structures

travellers

would have to pay less ? Should

Should

airlines

flyer programs

because

just because

to fly on higher

full fare
frequent

priced

tickets

?

?

whom we consider

cannot be answered

to be a representative

expression

"public".

in mind that air transportation,

easily.

ultimately,

is a public

responsive

system

of the all

it must be kept

developed,

and consumer

on

However,

of having

healthy

They also

depending

member

necessity.320 The social utility

transportation

flyer

with frequent

that the answer may well be different

encompassing

serve

it encourages

be forced to discontinue

These questions
reveal

to

to fly on deep discount

simple and uniform

travellers

after

the best deal. But it has

interest

corporate

No

who would have been otherwise

air travel,

be discontinued

pricing".

for a lay person

the public

programs

debt

?

(Eastern)

doubt,

and leveraged

far exceeds what

a well
air

is reflected

by the

320The expression "public utility" is not used to
avoid introducing into the discussion the special
connototions that expression has for economists and public
policy practitioners.
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private

profits

of the airlines

Nor does the costs incurred
the societal

expenditure

the infrastructure
industry,

on building

Participants

public

have a right to expect that airline

be tolerated

with greater

in less socially

in the

responsibility

in most other industries

will run their businesses
would

fully reveal

up and maintaining

have a greater

than do the participants

such service.

by the airlines

for such services.

therefore,

consumers

providing

and

managements

restraint

than

significant

businesses.
However,
onerous

responsibilities

"hazardous"
generally
ensure

aside from recognizing

nature

in respect

of the business,

ignored the "social"

that their business

the very existence

the necessity
of safety

activities

acceptable
airline,

acquisitions
company

object
airline

of airlines,

transfers

subsidiaries

of financing

or holding

of such statutory
management

and acceptable

corporations
scrutiny

from embarking

disclosure
regarding

for operating

for takeovers

of assets between

system.

guidelines

levels of debts and liquidity

sources

to

does not jeopardize

of the air transportation

coupled with statutory

have

of airlines

To ensure this, some form of mandatory
requirements

due to the

commentators

obligation

of more

an

or

types of intra-

airlines

and their

may be in order. The

would be to prevent
on a perilous

an

adventure
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at the expense
airline's

of the consumers

creditors

Regarding
airlines,

the question

consequence

different

segments

tickets

both nontransferable

statutory

of most airlines

concerned,

A

from making

such

should

flyer programs

do perceive

is no ground

a corporation

business

them as highly
business

for discontinuing

these programs.

are really

it is open for them to take appropriate

tickets.

of forcing
the general

employee

Moreover,

the airlines
public

travellers

class and first class

or its shareholders

stop their corporate

are

of these programs

The fact that it encourages

to buy more expensive

~1

is not

and nonrefundable

popularity

that consumers

expensive

the

"discounted"

to consumers.

airlines

as far as frequent

the extreme

desirable.

this

However,

in

deal with this problem.

Finally,

suggests

321

and nonrefundable

prohibiting

both nontransferable

effectively

price elasticities

of making

and does cause hardship

provision

pricing by

appear to be an

of the airline market.

practice

tickets

of discriminatory

of different

general

justifiable

the

and its shareholders.

the wide range of prices

inevitable

tickets

of air transport,

from travelling

bothered

If
by

action to
on the more

there seems no social benefit

to stop selling

cheaper

tickets to

so that it could sell less expensive

See supra Chapter

5.
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tickets

to a class of persons who does not seem to mind or

care that they pay more than the general
Since air transportation
just a small section
machinery
weigh

and balance

sections

6.6

are chosen

the competing

of the society.

question:

who or what

The Choice

cannot become

of society,

and methods

public.

whatever

the alcove

regu~atory

should be able to judge,
needs of different

This brings us to the third basic

is to perform

of Requlatorv

this task?

Structure

If one hears the debate raging through
circles

or in the pages of the popular

impression
present

that the only policy

form of "deregulation"

"reregulation".
alternatives
of solving

6.6(1)

However,

available
the current

Rerequlation

We have already
able prevent

choices

the industry

press one gets the
available

are these the only policy

nor do either
problems

of them seem capable

of the industry.

not warranted
seen that "deregulation"
of the industry

it has created

allowed

such problems

certain

charecteristics

to develop

has not been

from developing.

conditions

which have

by not anticipating

of airline markets.

But does that mean a return to a regulatory
based

are the

or a CAB type

niether

the problems

On the contrary,

of

on that established

by the civil Aeronautics

structure
Act is
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necessary

or even desirable?

Or, to put it differently,

is it reasonable

to expect a new regulatory

out the problems

of the industry

be in the best interests

to directly
country

and abroad,

assuming
airline
would

regulate

that the
markets

enable

informed

attempts

one would be inclined

(hopefully better)

to say no. Even

understanding

during

of

the last decade

agency to act in an

it is extremely

doubtful

in a more efficient

that it would

or socially

be

relevant

than its predecessor.

The history
poorly

of the airline

our regulators

transportation

industry

had understood

system. within

their hold on the industry,

domestic

air transport

a mockery

uniform

of linear routes,

prices,

proponents

assumptions

and opponents

of persons

knowledge"

had changed.

of forty years of "studies

on assumptions

day CAB would

the needs of the
of

the entire map of
The market

simply made

and research"

direct

flights

based

and

which were shared by both

of deregulation.

would believe

of the nature

has shown how

less than two years

relaxing

naive

?

in the past, both in this

such a regulatory

able to function
manner

business

which would

with the various

and competition

manner,

in a manner

of the public

In view of our experience

agency to sort

Only the most

that with this "new found

of airline

competition,

a present

be the answer to all of the industry's

woe.
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Moreover,
appeasing

the considerable

the country,
extent

in view of the political

there

is no guarantee

of authority

adequate.

However,

regulatory
economic

strong

granted

activity,

it is almost

certain

by substituting

Aside

of the market

set of values
a regulatory

and preferences

to public

demands

6.6(2)

Need for employinq

control

an
for the

one, leads

regulation

suffers

it restricts

on the public.

the system

be

that any kind of

the

and substitutes

set up has no effective

about whether

or

wasteful.

First,

participants

in

day CAB would

its judgement

from its high costs, direct

from two great disadvantages.

lobby"

even an imperfect

and is socially

of

that the nature

to a modern

of the marketplace,

to inefficiencies

feedback

"free market

regime which tries to directly

judgement

choice

necessity

means

its own

Second,

such

of receiving

is adequately

responding

and preferences.

indirect.

non intrusive

forms

of regulation
Does that mean then that nothing
the government,

that we would

should be done by

just have to live with

things

as they are and hope that in some magical

market

will reform

itself and the problems

way the

will be swept

away ? One should hope not. Once we give up the stereo
type characterization
"competitive"

of markets

as "contestable"

and look at them simply as "markets"

or
which
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need some help from the government,
better position

we might be in a

to deal with the problems.

What is required

now is to end the futile debate

about whether to go back to a regulated
with the deregulation
possibilities

experiment,

of employing

era or to continue

and focus instead on the

the various other non intrusive

forms of policy instruments

available

to a government

to

help the market. The market may not be the "best"
alternative.

But in this imperfect world it is the one

which is likely to prove the most responsive
of the general public. A regulatory
informed,

to the needs

agency, however well

can only second guess what the public needs.

If the market fails to respond adequately
needs, the solution

is not necessarily

the removal of

individual

choice of the market participants

substitute

that with the dictates

A more sensible

and

of a regulatory

course is to try to influence

of the market participants

to such

agency.

the choice

rather than take away the

choice altogether.
with this in mind, and in view of the above
observations
problems
regarding

and analysis

of airline competition

facing the industry, a few suggestions
some regulatory

instead of resorting

measures

and the
are made

which could be tried

to reregulation

or plain inaction. In

keeping with the nature of industry and the issues
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involved

the proposed

at the Federal

level.

6.7

Proposed

A.

SETTING

(a)

Constitution

Requlatorv

lawyers

Measures

UP OF AN ADVISORY

body may be set up consisting

experts,

academicians,

and elected

and study of various

operations

in the country.

to submit
Advisory

groups

management

representatives

commission

consumer

BODY.

and Procedure

A statutory
industry

actions would have to be implemented

for the

of airline

Representatives

and other interested

Body though

experts,

of the public

aspects

their views on subjects

of airline

of airlines,

persons

would

being studied

be able

by the

there would be no right of a personal

hearing.
In its functioning
responsibility

the Advisory

of properly

Body will have the

considering

all material

it but its proceedings

will not be in the nature

administrative

and there will be no lengthy

process"
(b)

hearing

of an
"due

requirements.

Functions
The Advisory

1.

before

Identify
number

Body would:

the principal

of airlines

reasonably

support.

hubs in the country

and the

each of these hubs could
It would

also report

on the
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actual

presence

instances

of airlines

in such hubs and

where a single airline

had access

to more

than 50% of the landing slots.
2.

Identify
health

suitable

of airlines

performance
3.

indices to measure
and periodically

of individual

Issue guidelines
shareholders

airlines

for lending

and creditors

4.

Identify
chronic

congestion

could be developed

congestion.

Also suggest

incentives

Identify

industry

in

industry.
from

alternative

airport

to relieve

such

airports.
and suggest means

growth

airports

of such an Advisory

as a result

and project

of

Body would be three
scrutiny

and the government

would

to the needs of the public

the enhanced

public

future

and aircrafts.

of such continual

both the airlines

Second,

keeping

types of tax or other

in air traffic

able to react promptly
market.

indices,

airports

needs of infrastructure,

fold. First,

debt/asset

them more efficiently.

study trends

The object

or

which might be given to encourage

underutilized

utilizing

acceptable

are suffering

and suggest

use of such alternative

6.

which

sites which

indirect

5.

ratios,

needs of the airline

those airports

the

in this behalf.

regarding

and other such financial

view the special

review

institutions,

safe limits of debt/liquidity
ratios

the, economic

exposure

of the
be

and the

of airline
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management

functioning

guidelines

and economic

speculative
mentioned
Board

government

health

and pernicios

desirable

practices

incentives

on a continuing

and disincentives

feedback

for

to the

basis and the government
of the results

would

of the

provisions.

B.

DIVESTURE

OF THE CRS INDUSTRY.

C.

MANDATORY

DISCLOSURE

Suitable

statutory

REQUIREMENTS.

provisions

may be enacted

impose mandatory

disclosure

requirements:

1.

management

regarding

2.

of the kind

of the Advisory

conduct would be available

also get very important
statutory

management

statutory

of the

indices would discourage

above. Third, the proposals

regarding

inducing

and the availability

For airline
management

decisions

identified

by the Advisory

For travel

agents regarding

the effect

to

of major

on the indices of airline

health

Body.
ownership

of CRS used by

them.
3.

4.

For persons

contemplating

of airlines

regarding

and acquisitions

the source of their finances

and, if financed

through

and the proposed

manner

For airlines

takeovers

debt, the terms of such debt
of repaying

the same.

and CRS owners regarding

other airlines

or CRS owners.

agreements

with
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D.

PROHIBIT

SALE OF NONTRANSFERABLE

AND NONREFUNDABLE

TICKETS.
A statutory
tickets

which

provision

are both nontransferable

may be enacted.

If a ticket

nontransferable,

the passenger

1.

3.

as

If the ticket

is nonrefundable

to transfer

AIRPORT

provisions

the fare

it.

ACCESS.

suitable

statutory

Ensuring

that not more than 50% of the landing slots

available
2.

REGARDING

of

an~ nonrefundable

is charecterized

must be permitted

PROVISIONS

the selling

the airline must agree to refund

in case of a cancellation.

E.

prohibiting

at an airport

Fixing higher

airports

congested

airports.

for:

is used by one airline.

rates of landing charges

congested

Fixing higher

may be made

for more

than those fixed for less

rates of landing charges

landing during peak traffic

for flights

hours as compared

to

those for off peak hour flights.

F.

PERMIT

FOREIGN AIRLINES

OPERATE

G.

PROHIBIT

ON U.S. DOMESTIC

EXCLUSIVE

OR THEIR U.S. SUBSIDIARIES
ROUTES.

DEALING AGREEMENTS

OWNERS AND AIRLINES.

BETWEEN

CRS

TO
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The above proposals

seek to indirectly

market

participants

induce

them to adhere to a standard

to be desirable

in a manner which,

hopefully,

of conduct

on the basis of an objective

study of the industry.
nebulous

and before

Obviously,

any concrete

regulatory

some guidance

law makers

designing

in the matter

of

try to cure the imperfections
without

participants.

taking

are only

steps are
However,

to lawyers

methods

and limitations

away the individual

would

and rigorous

in depth.

hoped that they will provide

the

considered

these proposals

taken they would have to be studied

market

influence

it
and

which will
of the

choice

of its
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